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       This dissertation consists of two essays. Each essay measures how changes in 
particular market rules and structure affect financial market outcomes. The essays assess 
two of the most debated regulatory issues that have arisen in recent years, speculative 
trading and transparency, respectively. The implication of the empirical results obtained 
in both essays is that the financial market reacts to regulatory changes and that 
regulations designed to improve the financial market do not necessarily yield the 
expected outcome. Both studies provide useful policy implications in terms of improving 
the quality of financial markets.  
       In the first essay, I evaluate how increased speculator participation in the commodity 
futures market affects market outcomes, including trades’ price impacts, price volatility, 
and market quality. The results indicate that speculators either have no effect or stabilize 
prices during periods of substantial price movement. Speculators on average sell during 
periods of large price appreciation, consistent with the interpretation that speculators’ 
trades dampen rather than accentuate price increases. My analysis also reveals that 
futures speculation reduces spot price volatility and that futures speculation either has no 
effect or improves liquidity and short-term efficiency in the commodity market. Recent 
policy changes under the Dodd–Frank Act aim to regulate speculative trading in the 
futures market to bring order to the commodity markets. My study suggests that these 
regulatory changes may well be counterproductive to that goal. 
  
iv 
       The second essay examines the effect of enhanced transparency on firm value and 
liquidity by studying the introduction and subsequent discontinuation of the NextPrime 
and NextEconomy market segments on the Euronext stock market. I document positive 
effects on firm value and liquidity for the firms that opted into the segments, thereby 
committing to enhanced transparency and improved reporting quality. However, when 
similar market regulations were imposed on all listed firms, I document negative 
valuation effects, on average. My analysis offers an important implication regarding rules 
governing market transparency: firms’ self-regulation to improve transparency can be 
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       This dissertation consists of two essays. The purpose of each essay is to assess how 
changes in market rules and structure affect financial market outcomes. The essays assess 
two of the most debated regulatory issues that have arisen in recent years, speculative 
trading and transparency, respectively.      
       In the first essay, I examine how the process of “financialization” of commodities 
has affected commodity prices and assess whether the proposed regulatory changes are 
effective in stabilizing the commodity market. The recent fluctuation of commodity 
prices accompanied by a substantial increase in trading activity in the futures market has 
led to a renewed interest in the effect of commodity futures trading on the spot market. 
The perception of the general public, policy makers, and practitioners is that increased 
participation of speculators in the futures markets has made an important contribution to 
commodity price fluctuations. Consistent with this view, several regulatory changes 
under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank 
Act) aim to stabilize the asset market by restricting speculative trading activity in the 
futures market. In the academic literature, debate continues over whether commodity 
price fluctuation is due to futures speculation or economic fundamentals. 
       Motivated by recent regulatory changes and renewed academic interest in
2 
 
   
understanding the effect of futures speculation, I provide empirical evidence to assess 
whether speculator trading in the futures market has a destabilizing effect on the 
commodity market. Using comprehensive lists of commodity futures included in the 
popular commodity indices, I investigate whether futures speculation relates to large 
price changes. More specifically, I assess whether futures speculation explains the 
movement of commodity prices during periods of substantial price increases or decreases. 
I also examine whether the speculative trading activity in the futures market is related to 
increased spot price volatility and lowering market quality. 
       The empirical results show that speculators either have no effect or stabilize prices 
during periods of substantial price movement. Speculators on average sell during periods 
of large price appreciation, consistent with the interpretation that speculators’ trades 
dampen rather than accentuate price increases. My analysis also reveals that futures 
speculation reduces spot price volatility and that futures speculation either has no effect 
or improves liquidity and short-term efficiency in the commodity market. My study 
suggests that regulating speculative trading in the futures market may well be 
counterproductive to bring order to the commodity markets.  
       By studying the introduction and discontinuation of the NextPrime and 
NextEconomy market segments on Euronext, the second essay examines the effect of 
enhanced transparency on a firm’s value and liquidity. I document positive valuation 
effects for the firms that opted into the segments and committed to enhance transparency 
and improve reporting quality. The empirical tests show that when firms decided to join 
the two market segments, their liquidity improved compared to firms that did not join the 
segments. These results suggest that transparency affects firm liquidity, which is
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consistent with the findings of existing literature. 
       When similar market regulations are imposed on all listed firms and replace the 
functions of the voluntary market segments, results reveal negative valuation effects for 
all firms. In addition, firms that did not join the segments experienced lower liquidity 
compared to those that joined segments, even after the segments discontinued. A 
marketwide regulation that mandates similar requirements does not seem to yield the 
expected outcomes when similar channels provided by a local exchange are eliminated. 
My empirical results in the second essay provide several interesting insights. First, 
the benefit of exchanges’ provisions for firms to improve transparency is not confined to 
developing financial markets but is also applied to more developed financial markets, 
where the effect of bonding mechanisms is not clearly a priori relative to less developed 
financial markets. Second, my results suggest which types of rules and regulations are 
more likely to produce their intended outcome. It seems that firms’ self-regulation to 
improve transparency is more effective than is marketwide mandatory regulation. Finally, 
this study documents that improved transparency affects liquidity, providing strong 
support for the positive relation between transparency and liquidity. 
       The implication of the empirical results obtained in each essay is that the financial 
market reacts to regulatory changes and that regulations designed to improve the financial 
market do not necessarily yield the expected outcome. The findings in both studies 
provide useful policy implications in terms of improving the quality of financial markets.  
 










       This paper examines how increased speculator participation in the commodity 
futures market affects market outcomes, including trades’ price impacts, price volatility, 
and market quality. Contrary to the popular belief that speculators are responsible for the 
recent commodity price fluctuation, my analysis finds no evidence that speculators 
destabilize the commodity spot market. Instead, speculators contribute to lower price 
volatility, enhanced price efficiency, and better liquidity in the commodity markets. More 
importantly, I show that speculators either have no effect or stabilize prices during 
periods of large price movement. My findings suggest speculators have had a significant 
and in fact positive influence on the commodity market during the recent 
“financialization” period, implying that restricting speculative trading in the futures 
market is not an efficient way to stabilize the commodity market. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
       The recent fluctuation of commodity prices accompanied by a substantial increase in 
trading activity in the futures market has led to a renewed interest in the effect of 
commodity futures trading on the spot market. Fig. 2.1 displays the time series of
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crude oil prices, open interest in oil futures, and the ratio of speculative positions in the 
crude oil futures market. The perception of the general public, policy makers, and 
practitioners is that increased participation of speculators in the futures markets has made 
an important contribution to commodity price fluctuations.
1
 Consistent with this view, 
several regulatory changes under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) aim to stabilize the asset market by restricting 
speculative trading activity in the futures market. In the academic literature, debate 




       Motivated by recent regulatory changes and renewed academic interest in 
understanding the effect of futures speculation, I provide empirical evidence to assess 
whether speculators’ trading in the futures market has a destabilizing effect on the 
commodity market. Using 21 commodity futures that are widely traded in the U.S. 
futures market, I investigate whether futures speculation relates to large price changes. 
More specifically, I assess whether futures speculation explains the movement of 
commodity prices during periods of substantial price increases or decreases. Next, I 
examine the effect of futures speculation on spot price volatility and market quality. For 
this analysis, I use 14 agricultural and energy commodities: crude oil, heating oil, 
gasoline, natural gas, wheat, corn, soybeans, Kansas wheat, cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, 
lean hogs, and live cattle. These commodities have experienced a substantial increase in
                                                 
1
 For example, Joseph Kennedy II, a former U.S. representative from Massachusetts, expressed concern 
over speculative trading in the oil market. He claimed that speculators drive commodity price fluctuation 
and futures trading should be limited. (“The High Cost of Gambling on Oil,” April 10, 2012, The New York 
Times). Masters (2008) also argues that the commodity price spikes were the result of price bubble created 
by speculators in the commodity futures markets. 
2
 Fattough et al. (2012) and Cheng and Xiong (2013) provide a comprehensive literature review of the 
debate over whether commodity price fluctuation is due to futures speculation or economic fundamentals. 
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speculators’ participation in the futures market and a recent boom-and-bust cycle in 
prices. Additionally, these commodities are contained in the Standard & Poor's Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index (S&P−GSCI) and the Dow Jones−UBS Commodity Index 
(DJ−UBSCI), the most popular commodity price indices. Passive index investors tend to 
hold long positions in commodity indices, using strategic asset allocations between 
commodities and other traditional assets. Tang and Xiong (2012) note that such trading 
patterns can create large price impacts and volatility spillovers across commodities. 
       I use the Commitments of Traders (COT) report provided by the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to construct speculators’ positions in the 
commodity futures. The COT report separates traders into commercial (hedgers) and 
noncommercial traders (speculators). To mitigate the limitations of relying on the COT 
data set, I also use the CFTC’s Disaggregate Commitments of Traders (DCOT) report 
and the Supplemental Commodity Index Traders (CIT) report to construct the futures 
positions that are held by various types of traders. The DCOT report separates traders 
into the following four categories: producer/merchant/processor/user, swap dealer, 
managed money, and other reportables. The managed money trader type includes hedge 
funds and professional managers, which are de facto speculators to whom I pay special 
attention in my analysis. The CIT report is available for selected agricultural commodity 
futures and divides traders into index traders, nonindex speculators, commercial traders, 
and nonreportables. The long-only index traders have become the center of debate among 
politicians and practitioners as their speculative buying is believed to create bubbles in 
commodity prices (Irwin et al., 2009). I provide detailed information regarding these 
reports in the Data section. 
       I study periods during which prices rose or fell substantially and assess in a cross-
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sectional analysis whether the magnitude of price changes is related to changes in 
speculative positions. If speculators destabilize the markets, the effects of speculators 
should be most notable during periods where price changed substantially, ex post. 
Therefore, examining the periods with substantial price changes provides a relatively 
powerful test compared to other empirical methods that focus on return predictability. I 
find that speculative trading in general is not related to large price changes over the 5-, 
10-, and 20-week intervals. More importantly, the long positions of speculators are not 
related to large price increases and even help suppress extreme price increases. This 
finding provides clear evidence that futures speculation is irrelevant to the large increase 
in commodity prices, especially in the energy commodity market. I employ a novel 
approach, distinct from the existing studies that primarily depend on the Granger (1969) 
causality tests. In competitive markets, past trading is not a reliable predictor of future 
price changes. In addition, weekly returns have fat tails; therefore, Granger causality tests 
tend to be misspecified. 
       My analysis reveals that futures speculation contributes to reducing spot price 
volatility. This result holds when I construct speculative positions using either the COT 
or the DCOT report. The stabilizing effect is dominant during the post-2003 period, 
during which increased participation by speculators in the commodity futures market is 
considered responsible for the substantial spot market price fluctuation. My empirical 
results also indicate that financialization does not relate to increased commodity price 
volatility, which is consistent with the findings of recent papers (Buyuksahin and Harris, 
2011; Irwin and Sanders, 2012c; Aulerich et al., 2013; Brunetti et al., 2013).
3
   
                                                 
3
 The process of commodity futures having become a popular asset class for portfolio investors is referred 
to as the financialization of commodity markets (Cheng and Xiong, 2013).  
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        Furthermore, I document how different types of traders in the futures market affect 
commodity price volatility. For example, among speculators, traditional speculators (e.g.,  
hedge funds or floor traders) appear to stabilize spot prices and provide liquidity to the 
commodity markets. Using the CIT report, I show that commodity index traders do not 
destabilize the prices of agricultural commodities, contrary to the concerns raised by 
policy makers and practitioners. 
       I also assess the effect of futures speculation on market quality using liquidity and 
price efficiency measures. When liquidity increases, information is better incorporated 
into prices, thus enhancing information efficiency. I use the Roll (1984) liquidity measure 
to assess whether futures speculation contributes to enhanced information efficiency in 
commodity prices. In addition, I conduct a variance ratio test to assess how the futures 
trading activity of speculators relates to short-term efficiency in the spot market. 
Efficiency implies an approximate random walk in prices over short horizons, which in 
turn implies that the variance ratio should be very close to 1. To be more specific, if the 
price is very close to random walk over 1 week, the ratio of daily return variance to the 
return variance over 1 week should be very close to 1. A variance ratio above or below 1 
indicates a deviation from the random walk; therefore, I use the absolute value of 
(1−variance ratio) to measure deviations from the random walk in either direction. My 
analysis shows that futures speculation either has no effect or improves liquidity and 
short-term efficiency in the commodity market. Combined with an analysis of volatility, 
the analysis of liquidity and price efficiency provides strong evidence that speculators in 




   
       A growing number of studies examine the effect of speculation on prices and how it 
alters the relation between equity markets and the futures market. In addition to 
supporting the findings of these studies, my paper provides strong evidence for the 
stabilizing effect of speculation by employing empirical methods that are distinct from 
existing studies. Instead of focusing on the effect on the futures prices, I show that the 
presence of speculators in the futures market lowers price volatility and prevents extreme 
price movement in the spot market. Moreover, I find that futures speculation contributes 
to short-run price efficiency and liquidity, which has been neglected in the existing 
literature. Finally, by employing comprehensive data on speculators’ positions in the 
futures markets, I provide robust empirical evidence that futures speculation stabilizes the 
commodity market. 
       In the next section, I provide a through literature review and discuss how my findings 
differ from the existing studies. Section 2.4 describes the data sets that are employed in 
my analysis. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical methods. Section 2.6 reports the 
empirical findings and Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.3 Literature Review and Contributions 
       In theory, the futures market contributes to market completion, an increase in market 
depth, and information dissemination (Danthine, 1978; Kyle, 1985; Grossman, 1988; 
Froot and Perold, 1995). These theoretical studies predict that trading in the futures 
market stabilizes the spot market. Peck (1976) shows that the commodity futures market 
dampens price fluctuations by facilitating the markets for storage. Silber (1985) discusses 
the economic benefits of speculators such as risk sharing and price discovery in
10 
 
   
agricultural commodity futures. These models suggest the crucial role of speculative 
trading in stabilizing spot prices. Futures trading attracts speculators, who trade on future 
expectations and information about assets. These expectations are incorporated into the 
spot prices, which makes spot prices more informative about economic fundamentals. In 
addition, the presence of speculators makes it possible for hedgers to transfer their risk, 
which is the most important function of the futures market. 
       Other models argue that once badly informed speculators trade in the futures market 
to take advantage of lower transaction costs and higher leverage, the benefits of futures 
markets diminish. Hart and Kreps (1986) and Stein (1987) document that rational 
speculators can destabilize the spot market for storable commodities. De Long et al. 
(1990b) argue that noisy traders’ beliefs can move prices away from their fundamental 
value. Chari et al. (1990) show that the introduction of the futures market can destabilize 
the spot market when there is no information friction in the market. Shalen (1993) argues 
that futures trading can increase volatility because uninformed traders cannot identify 
fundamental information and liquidity needs. Harris and Raviv (1993) share a similar 
prediction that the positive relation between volume and volatility is stronger when there 
are more disagreements among traders.  
       A large number of empirical studies examine the impact of futures trading on the 
cash market (Figlewski, 1981; Bhattacharya et al., 1986; Edwards, 1988a, 1988b; 
Schwert, 1990; Weaver and Banerjee, 1990; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992; Chang et 
al., 1997; Kocagil, 1997; Chatrath and Song, 1999; Fleming and Ostdiek, 1999; Kyriacou 
and Sarno, 1999; Gulen and Meyhew, 2000; Kim et al., 2004; Bohl et al., 2011; Chen et 
al., 2012). Most of these studies focus on how the introduction of the futures market       
11 
 
   
affects spot prices, using various futures products and futures markets in different 
countries. The results are inconclusive. This may imply that futures products differ in 
their characteristics, and it may imply that different model specifications prompt 
conflicting conclusions. In addition, as pointed out by Bessembinder and Seguin (1992), 
a crucial reason for the differing conclusions may be the confounding effects of other 
economic events surrounding the introduction of the futures market. Similar to my study, 
some studies assess the effect of futures trading on spot market volatility, but they do not 
distinguish the effects of different types of traders, nor do they examine the recent surge 
in speculation.
4
 Moreover, no studies assess the effect of speculation on short-run price 
efficiency or liquidity.  
       With the rapid growth in index investment in commodity futures and the 
financialization of commodity futures, several papers study the comovement between 
commodity futures and other assets and across different commodity futures (Buyuksahin 
at el., 2009; Tang and Xiong, 2012). Other studies also look at how different types of 
investor positions are related to price changes. Irwin and Sanders (2012a) discuss current 
empirical findings on the effect of index traders and conclude that index trading in the 
futures market is unrelated to a futures price bubble. Using detailed individual positions 
taken by traders, Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009) show that financial investors’ flow 
does not affect price volatility in the oil futures market. Stoll and Whaley (2010) test 
whether index fund trading causes commodity futures price changes. Singleton (2014) 
argues that information friction and its associated speculative activity can lead to 
commodity price fluctuation. Brunetti at el. (2013) and Buyuksahin and Harris (2011)
                                                 
4
 Daigler and Wiley (1999) and Wang (2003) investigate the effect of speculators and hedgers, but they test 
the relation between futures volume and volatility. 
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find no evidence that speculators destabilize financial markets and find instead that 
speculative trading reduces volatility in the futures market. Hamilton and Wu (2013) 
document that there is no relation between the notional value of commodity futures 
contracts held by index traders and the expected returns on futures contracts for 12 
agricultural commodities. Several papers provide a theoretical explanation for the effect 
of speculative trading on prices using the model of feedback trading (Sockin and Xiong, 
2013), supply and demand (Knittel and Pindyck, 2013), or quantity competition 
(Banerjee and Jagannathan, 2013). Basak and Pavlova (2013) and Cortazar et al. (2013) 
integrate financialization into the asset pricing model. 
       The empirical analysis of how speculative futures trading affects the spot market 
provides additional insights into the role of speculation. Studies that investigate the 
effects of speculators’ futures trading on price destabilization do exist, but most of the 
recent studies focus on futures prices (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; Stoll and Whaley, 
2009; Gilbert, 2010; Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2013; Henderson 
et al., 2012; Brunetti et al., 2013).
5
 When futures speculation is blamed for destabilizing 
prices, the concern is most typically with regard to the spot price for the commodity. 
Also, even though futures prices and spot prices are closely related through convenience 
yield and storage costs, the no-arbitrage condition need not hold as precisely in 
commodity futures as in equity index futures (see Knittel and Pindyck (2013) for detailed 
discussion). Futures speculation leads to changes in futures prices, which in turn leads to 
price changes in the spot market. However, the effects can be altered by changes in
                                                 
5
 One exception is Bohl and Stephan (2013), who analyze how expected and unexpected speculative open 
interest affects conditional volatility in six heavily traded futures markets. My study is closely related to 
their study, though my analysis is more comprehensive. I also test how futures speculation relates to price 
changes, which their study does not analyze. 
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inventory or production levels. Because activities in the market for storage vary, futures 
speculation can affect spot price changes and volatility differently from how it affects 
futures prices. 
       Recent studies investigate the effect of speculative trading in the futures market on 
the changes in commodity prices (Stoll and Whaley, 2010; Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; 
Aulerich et al., 2013). Using the Granger causality test, these studies examine how 
speculators’ positions in the futures markets affect the magnitude of price changes. 
However, in competitive markets, past trading would unlikely forecast price changes; 
therefore, it is not clear that a conclusion can be drawn using the lead-lag variable 
relationship. Instead, I focus on the periods during which prices rose or fell substantially 
and assess in a cross-sectional analysis whether the signed price changes are related to 
changes in speculative positions, controlling for futures volume and other economic 
factors that would affect prices. I document that speculative trading in general is not 
related to large price changes over the 10- and 20-week intervals.   
       In addition to examining whether futures speculation induces increased spot 
volatility, I analyze whether futures trading contributes to improved short-term market 
efficiency and liquidity. Existing studies have neglected the analysis of market quality in 
the spot market so far. The finding that futures speculation contributes to maintaining 
short-run price efficiency and liquidity is clear evidence that futures speculation benefits 
the commodity market. Moreover, in my analysis of energy and agricultural markets, I 
control for several economic variables that are important to the spot price and its 
volatility. I include information on commodity inventory and production as well as other 
macroeconomic variables to mitigate concerns about omitted variables relevant to spot 
volatility.   
14 
 
   
2.4 Data 
       I use 21 commodity futures that are traded in the U.S. futures market with reliable 
spot price data in the analysis on the relationship between price changes and speculative 
trading activity. I obtain daily spot prices, the total open interest, and the futures trading 
volume from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). “Open interest” refers to the 
number of outstanding futures contracts that are not yet offset by a transaction. Futures 
volume reflects the overall trading activity in the futures market and is measured in the 
number of futures contracts. In assessing whether futures speculation affects volatility 
and market quality, I use 14 widely traded agricultural and energy commodities and their 
futures contracts: wheat, soybean, corn, Kansas wheat, cotton, cocoa, coffee, sugar, lean 
hogs, and live cattle for agricultural commodities and crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and 
natural gas for energy commodities. These commodities experienced large price 
fluctuations and a substantial increase in open interest over the entire period in the 
analysis, especially during the later period of my sample. Additionally, production and 
inventory data are available for these commodities. 
       To construct the positions that are held by each trader type, I use several position 
data sets available from the CFTC. In constructing speculators’ positions, I use the 
weekly COT report. Since 1986, the CFTC has provided the outstanding positions of 
traders. The weekly reports, which start in October 1992, are released on Fridays and 
reflect positions as of the preceding Tuesday. If trade size exceeds certain thresholds set 
by the CFTC, each trader is required to report the positions that they hold. The traders’ 
reported positions are categorized as either commercials (hedgers) or noncommercials 
(speculators). If futures contracts are primarily used for hedging purposes, the trader is
15 
 
   
is classified as commercial; otherwise, traders are categorized as noncommercial. The 
CFTC staff evaluates the trader classifications and can reclassify the trading entity if 
necessary. If trade size does not exceed the threshold set by the CFTC, the trade is 
classified as the nonreportable position. Following Irwin and Sanders (2010), I calculate 
the total futures positions held by each trader type as following: 
(i) Gross speculative positions = long noncommercial open interest + short 
noncommercial open interest + 2 × spread
6
 
(ii) Gross hedging positions = long commercial open interest + short 
commercial open interest 
(iii) Gross nonreportable positions = long nonreported open interest + short 
nonreported open interest 
       Table 2.1 provides information on commodities and their futures contracts that are 
used in my analysis. I use data from October, 1992, when the weekly open interest data 
became available from the CFTC, to July, 2012. Panel A displays futures contract 
specifications such as contract size, the exchanges on which the futures contracts are 
traded, and their expiration months. Panels B and C provide information on prices and 
speculators’ market shares in commodity futures that have inventory data. As shown in 
Panel B, the commodity prices substantially increased over time, and they are more 
volatile in the later period in the sample. Panel C indicates that the increases in the 
commodity price level and volatility are accompanied by a large increase in speculators’ 
market share in the commodity futures market. 
                                                 
6
 For more detailed information, refer to COT Explanatory Notes, available at the CFTC’s webpage, 
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/ExplanatoryNotes/index.htm. Spread is the 
amount each noncommercial trader holds in equal long and short futures positions. For example, if a 
noncommercial trader holds 2,000 long contracts and 1,500 short contracts, 500 contracts will appear in the 
long position. Spread is 1,500 in this case. Spread is reported only for noncommercial traders. 
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       I also use the DCOT report that has been available since June, 2006. The DCOT 
report separates traders into the following four categories: producer/merchant/processor 
/user, swap dealers, managed money, and other reportables. The first two groups of 
traders are comparable to the commercial traders in the COT report. The 
producer/merchant/processor/user trader type consists of traditional hedgers, such as the 
producers and consumers of the commodities who primarily use futures markets for 
hedging purposes. Swap dealers use the futures market to hedge the risk from swap 
trading. Because their trading counterparts include speculators, swap dealers can bring 
speculative activity to the market. In addition, swap dealers often take positions for index 
funds, whose herding behavior and tendency to hold long-only positions in commodity 
futures can affect the futures market and hence the spot market. Money managers and 
other reportables are comparable to the noncommercial traders in the COT report. 
Specifically, money managers are the classical types of speculators, such as hedge funds 
or floor traders, who trade on behalf of their clients. The analysis using these data sets 
provides additional information on how different types of traders' trading activity affect 
the spot market. 
       Studies have raised concerns about solely relying on the COT report. Those who 
claim to have a cash position in the underlying assets can report themselves as being 
commercial traders; therefore, a commercial position can include speculators' positions. 
Several researchers also argue that this limitation is one of the reasons why hedging 
pressure measures, which are constructed from the weekly COT data, produce different 
results among studies (Ederington and Lee, 2002; Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; Gorton  
et al., 2012; Acharya et al., 2013; Dewally et al., 2013).  
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       One advantage of using the DCOT report is that the distinction between speculators 
and hedgers is clearer than in the COT report. The DCOT data are available since mid-
2006, which overlaps with the financialization period in which I am interested. They also 
provide a more distinct classification of hedgers and speculators, which helps me to 
produce robust results in my analysis. The CFTC also acknowledges that this data set is 
more transparent about trader classification.
7
  
       I also employ the CIT report to construct the futures positions that are held by index 
traders for agricultural commodities. The CIT report is available from 2006 for selected 
agricultural futures. The CIT report divides traders into index traders, nonindex 
speculators, commercial traders, and nonreportables. The “index trader” category of the 
CIT report includes swap dealers as well as pension and other investment funds that place 
their index investment directly into the futures markets. According to Irwin and Sanders 
(2010), the majority of index trader positions come from the long positions of 
commercial traders. In the agricultural futures market, the positions taken by swap 
dealers from the DCOT report are very close to the positions taken by index traders from 
the CIT report; however, this is not the case for energy futures (CFTC, 2008; Irwin and 
Sanders, 2010). The use of this data set reduces the limitations of relying on the COT 
report, and it allows me to assess the effect of index traders on the commodity market. 
       I collect several variables that are known to influence commodity price changes and 
volatility. The quarterly and monthly inventory data on agricultural commodities are 
obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research 
Service. For cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar futures contracts, I collect inventory data
                                                 
7
 Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) and Brunetti et al. (2013) use nonpublic position data and report similar 
results for the effects of speculators’ trading on futures prices. 
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from the historical certified warehouse stocks available from the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE). The weekly inventory data on energy commodities are from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. Inventories act as buffers that absorb 
shocks to demand and supply, thus affecting spot prices. Deaton and Laroque (1992) 
show that at low inventory levels, both the risks of a stock-out and spot price volatility 
increase. Gorton et al. (2012) document that commodity inventory is an important 
economic factor that determines futures prices. 
       To control for the supply effect on price volatility, I obtain U.S. production data for 
each commodity from the USDA Economic Research Service and EIA energy production 
database. One might argue that because commodities are traded in multiple parts of the 
world, I should use production and inventory data at the global level. The primary reason 
for using U.S. data is the data quality, which reduces noise in my estimation. In addition, 
the center of debate is the speculative trading activity in the U.S. futures market. Frankel 
(2013) and Knittel and Pindyck (2013) also discuss the validity of using U.S. data instead 
of global data in terms of crude oil. Moreover, Kilian and Murphy (2013) use global data 
and find results that are similar to those obtained using U.S. data in other studies. 
       I include macroeconomic indicators to capture the effect of supply and demand 
shocks, which are shown to be important determinants of commodity prices during the 
past decade (Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012). I use the quarterly gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate and changes in the monthly production growth and inflation 
rate. These variables are constructed by using the data available from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. 
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2.5 Empirical Methods 
2.5.1 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Commodity Price Changes 
       I study periods when prices rose or fell substantially and assess whether the signed 
price changes are related to changes in speculative positions. I use a cross-sectional 
analysis to assess whether futures speculation is related to extreme, signed price changes 
and whether speculators’ long or short position is driving commodity price changes. The 
sample period starts in October, 1992 when the weekly COT report became available. 
       I divide the daily time series of commodity prices into nonoverlapping 5-, 10-, and 
20-week intervals and construct speculators’ total positions and speculators’ long and 
short positions using the COT report. I use Tuesday-to-Tuesday price changes because of 
the weekly frequency of the COT data. For each interval, I calculate the percentage 
changes in commodity prices and the percentage changes in speculators’ total, long, and 
short positions. I pool all commodities with at least 10% and 20% changes in prices over 
5-, 10-, and 20- week intervals and conduct the following cross-sectional regression with 
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       ΔP denotes the commodity price changes over the 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals and 
ΔSpeculation is the changes in futures positions held by speculators: the aggregate, long, 
and short positions of speculators in each commodity futures contract. ΔTFV is the 
changes in futures trading volume, ΔINV is the changes in inventory, ΔINF is the changes 
in inflation rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, and PROD is changes in the production 
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growth rate. For inventory data, I first deseasonalize them by regressing the inventory 
level on each month (or quarter) and use the residuals as a measure of inventory changes. 
The three macroeconomic variables are included to control for commodity demand and 
aggregate economic conditions that would affect the commodity price changes. 
its  is the 
seasonal dummy variable. I provide a separate analysis for the 15 commodities that have 
available inventory data. I also conduct a separate analysis for energy and agricultural 
commodities, considering that commodity futures are distinct among sectors, and more 
attention has been paid to the price changes in energy and agricultural commodities. 
       The coefficient on Speculation (β) indicates whether futures speculation is related to 
the signed changes in commodity prices. The dependent variables are the price changes in 
both directions; therefore, when the dependent variables are positive (negative) price 
changes, the negative (positive) or insignificant sign of β implies that on average 
speculators' position in commodity futures is unrelated to large spot price increases 
(decreases). 
 
2.5.2 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Spot Volatility 
       I adopt a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model 
to investigate the effect of futures trading activity by speculators and hedgers on spot 
volatility.
8
 The conditional mean is constructed as a first-order auto-regressive (AR) 
process with various control variables. Hong and Yogo (2012) and Gorton et al. (2012)
                                                 
8
 Compared to more complicated models, the GARCH (1,1) model is shown to work well in describing 
financial time series. Hansen and Lunde (2005) report that among various GARCH models, nothing 
outperforms GARCH(1,1). I also use the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) and The Glosten–Jagannathan–
Runkle GARCH (GJR-GARCH) (Glosten et al., 1993) models to capture the asymmetric volatility 
clustering in the commodity prices. The results are similar across different model specifications. I report the 
estimation results using the GARCH (1,1) model. 
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document open interest and inventories are strong predictors of commodity price 
changes. Therefore, I include the changes in open interest and inventories in the 
conditional mean equation. Following Gallant et al. (1992), I control for day-of-the-week 
effects to capture the daily shocks to returns and volatility. I also control for inflation to 
capture the effects of interest rate on price changes. In the conditional variance equation, 
I include open interest held by speculators and hedgers, noncategorized trades, and total 
trading volume. This is similar to Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), who control for 
aggregate trading activity in the futures market. Although my analysis focuses on the 
effect of speculators, I provide a separate analysis on the effect of hedgers to see if their 
position in the futures market has a distinct effect on the spot market. I interpret the 
coefficient of each trader type as the partial effect of each trader type on the spot 
volatility. 
       Unlike most existing studies, which include only trading activity variables in the 
analysis, I employ a wide set of variables that are known to be related to spot price 
changes. I include the changes in total U.S. production to control for the supply shocks 
in the commodity markets. Motivated by the theory of storage, I also control for changes 
in inventory level for each commodity. Moreover, I include macroeconomic variables to 
capture the aggregate economic conditions and demand effects on spot volatility. To 
control for the effect of the contract life cycle, I include days to expiration in the 
conditional volatility equation. As the Samuelson hypothesis (1965) states, for certain 
commodity futures, volatility increases near the time of contract expiration dates. As a 
contract is approaching its expiration date and investors adjust their positions to roll over 
their contracts or close them for portfolio balancing, more futures trading takes place,
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increasing volatility. Some commodities are in high demand or low in inventory during 
certain seasons. To capture the daily and seasonal variations, I include daily and seasonal 
dummy variables in the conditional volatility equation. 
       The analysis on spot volatility is based on the following GARCH (1,1) model: 
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Eq. (2.2) is estimated using the maximum likelihood method with robust standard errors. 
I calculate continuously compounded daily returns as log( / ) 100%t t tr P P  . ΔOPEN 
refers to the changes in total open interest, ΔINV to the changes in inventories, and ΔSUP 
to the changes in the commodity production level. GDP is the quarterly GDP growth rate, 
INF is the monthly inflation rate, and PROD is the monthly production growth rate. id is 
a dummy variable for each trading day, and is  is a seasonal dummy variable. NCR is the 
noncategorized traders, and TFV is the natural log of total futures trading volume. DTE is 
the square root of days to expiration. Whenever necessary, I first remove the time trend 
from the control variables and use the detrended data in the estimation. 
       The main variables of interest are 
1






  the decomposed 
positions of speculators and hedgers. The sign of i  reflects the directional effect of the 
partitioned position of each trader type. Following Bessembinder and Seguin (1992), I 
partition each trader's position into three components: expected, unexpected, and long-
term variation. Trading variables have a strong time trend in the futures market;
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therefore, I first detrend the logged trading activity variables by deducting a 100-day 
moving average for positions held by speculators and hedgers as well as for 
nonreportables. Then, I partition the detrended data into expected and unexpected data 
using the following multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) model: 
 
1
Controls                                                 (2.3)
p
t j t j t t
j
V a b V e
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     
where Vt is the transpose of a vector, [Speculators’ position, Hedgers’ position, 
Nonreportables, Futures volume]. Control variables include daily effects, GDP, INF, 
PROD and DTE. 
       The above detrending procedure generates the expected, unexpected, and long-run 
variation (MA) components for speculators and hedgers. The fitted value is the expected 
value for each trader type, and the residuals from the multivariate VAR model are the 
unexpected portion. The 100-day moving average series are the long-term shifts, the 
expected position is the forecastable short-run time-varying position, and the unexpected 
part reflects the information shock. Therefore, in the conditional volatility equation from 
Eq. (2.2), 
1






 is specified as,  
1 2 3 4 5 6                                 (2.4)t t t t t tESP USP MASP EH UH MAH           
where ESP (EH) is the expected speculators’ (hedgers’) position, USP (UH) is the 
unexpected speculators’ (hedgers’) position, and MASP (MAH) is the long-term 
variation component in speculators’ (hedgers’) position. 
       I confirm that each trading activity variable is stationary using the modified Dickey–
Fuller test proposed by Elliott et al. (1996), and I use the first-differenced data when the 
detrended variable is not stationary. Instead of using the univariate autoregressive
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integrated moving average (ARIMA) model used in previous studies, I estimate expected 
and unexpected trading activity conditioning on its own past trading activity and that of 
its correlated market. In the process, I control for daily effects, time to expiration, and 
macroeconomic variables. The reason for this partition method is that both futures 
volume and open interest respond to the same information shock; therefore, past volume 
and open interest have predictive ability in the current trading activity variables. The 
optimal lag was chosen by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). I employ a similar 
decomposition method when using the DCOT and the CIT reports in the volatility 
analysis. 
       In assessing the effect of trading activity on spot volatility, I calculate the net effect 
of each trader type. I multiply each estimated coefficient of the decomposed position by 
the average value of each component of open interest and sum up the resulting products. 
To be more specific, the net effect of speculators on spot volatility is  
                       Speculators’ net effect on spot volatility                                                 (2.5) 
= (θ1 × mean of ESP) + (θ2 × mean of USP) + (θ3 × mean of MASP) 
       The negative or insignificant net effect implies that the speculative position does not 
increase conditional spot volatility, controlling for the aggregate trading activity in the 
futures markets and economic variables that are used in Eq. (2.2). The negative or 
insignificant net effect also supports the stabilizing theory of futures speculation: 
speculators’ trading in the futures market lowers price volatility in the spot market via 
increased information diffusion from the futures market to the spot market.  Hedgers’ net 
effect on volatility is similarly defined as 
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                         Hedgers’ net effect on spot volatility                                                    (2.6) 
= (θ4 × mean of EH) + (θ5 × mean of UH) + (θ6 × mean of MAH) 
       I split the sample into two periods, pre- and post-2003. The later period overlaps with 
the financialization period, when speculators’ trading activity is believed to be 
responsible for the fluctuations in the spot price of the major commodity markets. If 
destabilizing effects dominate the later period, my analysis would support the recent 
regulatory changes that limit speculative trading in the commodity futures market. 
However, if speculators’ increased participation in the futures market helps lower spot 
volatility, this would indicate that futures speculation stabilizes the spot market. If this is 
the case, the regulatory changes to restrict speculators will not be effective in stabilizing 
the commodity market. 
 
2.5.3 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Market Quality 
       In addition to analyzing the effect of speculation on spot volatility, I investigate the 
contemporaneous relation between futures speculation and market quality. I use liquidity 
and short-term price efficiency as market quality measures. If speculators not only lower 
the spot volatility but also contribute short-term market efficiency and liquidity, the result 
would provide strong evidence that speculators stabilize the spot market. 
 
2.5.3.1 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Liquidity 
       I assess how futures speculation affects liquidity in the spot market. I use Roll’s 
(1984) liquidity measure by employing daily spot price data. Roll’s liquidity measure 
uses the serial covariance of the price changes as estimates of spreads, and it is useful
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when intradaily price or trading volume data are not available. 
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Using the following equation, I assess how futures speculation affects liquidity:  
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       ESP (EH) is the expected speculators’ (hedgers’) position, USP (UH) is the 
unexpected speculators’ (hedgers’) position, and MASP (MAH) is the long-term variation 
in speculators’ (hedgers’) position. I partition each trader's position using the multivariate 
VAR model (Eq. (2.3)) that I used in the previous analysis. Controls include futures 
trading volume, nonreported position, changes in inventory and production level, GDP 
growth, production growth, inflation, and seasonal dummy variables. The control 
variables are defined identically from the data I used in the analysis on spot volatility in 
section 2.4.2. Newey–West standard errors are used to control for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
       A higher Roll’s measure means lower liquidity, and thus the positive sign of each 
ˆ  indicates that each component of the trader’s position has a negative effect on 
liquidity. The liquidity measure is detrended whenever strong time trends are observed; 
that is, I regress the liquidity measure on time trend and use the residual as the 
dependent variables. 
       I calculate the net effect of speculators’ position as 
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                       Speculators’ net effect on liquidity                                                         (2.9) 
= ( 1ˆ  × mean of ESP) + ( 2ˆ  × mean of USP) + ( 3ˆ  × mean of MASP) 
The net effect of hedgers is defined similarly. The positive net effect implies that future 
speculation has a negative effect on liquidity in the commodity market. I divide my 
sample into pre- and post-2003 periods, paying special attention to the later period. 
 
2.5.3.2 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Short-term Price Efficiency 
       I analyze how speculators’ futures trading is related to short-term price efficiency 
using a variance ratio test. Efficiency implies an approximate random walk over short 
horizons, and variance ratio tests can indicate whether price changes have deviations 
from random walk. 
       Several empirical studies use the variance ratio test to capture market liquidity and 
information efficiency (Bessembinder, 2003; Chordia et al., 2008; Griffin et al., 2010).
9
 If 
futures trading activity helps information to be reflected in the spot market more 
efficiently and increases its market depth, spot returns would behave close to random 
walk. In contrast, if trading activity in the futures market attracts poorly informed traders 
and hinders information transfer and price discovery, the variance ratio would move 
away from the benchmark. For example, if a large number of momentum traders trade on 
unexpected price changes, positive autocorrelations will occur, which will cause price 
continuation. Alternatively, if less informed traders trade on nonfundamental information, 
prices will move away from the equilibrium path. As traders learn fundamental 
information, prices will move back to the equilibrium level, leading to a price reversal. 
                                                 
9
 Time-varying expected return can cause autocorrelation. The use of nonoverlapping weekly measures in 
my study reduces this concern. 
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       Specifically, the variance ratio (VR) is defined as 
[ ( )]











where rt is the return series, q is the number of lags in returns, and Var stands for the 
variance estimate. For example, the variance ratio on Tuesdays is defined as the ratio of 
weekly variance to five times the daily variance. I calculated the variance ratio using the 
Wednesday-to-Tuesday interval because the futures positions are reported to the CFTC 
every Tuesday. Also, the nonoverlapping weekly measure can mitigate the fact that the 
variance ratio is persistent over time. I follow Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Campbell et 
al. (1997) to produce a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. 
       To assess the effect of futures speculation on short-term price efficiency, I use the 
following regression for each commodity: 
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ESP (EH) is the expected speculators’ (hedgers’) position, USP (UH) is the unexpected 
speculators’ (hedgers’) position, and MASP (MAH) is the long-term variation in 
speculators’ (hedgers’) position. I partition each trader's position using the multivariate 
VAR model (Eq. (2.3)) that I used in the previous analysis. Controls include futures 
trading volume, nonreported positions, changes in inventory and production level, GDP 
growth, production growth, inflation, and seasonal dummy variables. The control 
variables are identical to those in the previous analysis. I use Newey–West standard 
errors to control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
       The dependent variable, (1−variance ratio), captures deviations from the benchmark 
in either direction because both negative and positive autocorrelation implies departure 
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from the random walk benchmark. The positive sign of the  s implies that each 
component of the trader’s position lowers the short-term price efficiency measure in the 
short term. I focus on the net effect of futures speculative activity in assessing whether 
futures speculation relates to short-term price efficiency in the spot market. 
       The speculators’ net effect on price efficiency is calculated as 
                      Speculators’ net effect on short-term efficiency                                    (2.12) 
= ( 1 × mean of ESP) + ( 2 × mean of USP) + ( 3 × mean of MASP) 
       The net effect of hedgers is defined similarly for each measure. Similar to the 
previous analysis, I focus on the post-2003 period. 
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Price Changes 
       I examine whether large price changes are related to speculation in the futures 
market. Table 2.2 reports the estimation results using the cross-sectional test described in 
Eq. (2.1). I test separately the effect of speculators’ total positions, long positions, and 
short positions in commodity futures. I divide the time series of commodity price changes 
into nonoverlapping 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals, and consider only periods with 
minimum 10% price movements. To conserve space, only the coefficients of the changes 
in speculator positions are reported.
10
 
       Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the cross-sectional analysis of the 5-, 10-, and 20-week 
intervals for all commodities when prices increase by at least 10% and 20%. The second, 
fourth, and sixth columns present the results when prices go up by at least 10% during
                                                 
10
 The entire estimation results are available upon request. 
30 
 
   
the 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals, respectively, and the third, fifth, and seventh columns 
present the results when prices go up by at least 20% for each given interval. The results 
indicate that there is a negative or no cross-sectional relation between large price 
increases and changes in the speculative positions in commodity futures. Additionally, 
when prices increase by at least 20%, the relation between increase of prices and changes 
in the speculators’ positions is more negative and statistically significant than in those 
cases where prices increase by at least 10%. For example, in the cross-sectional analysis 
of the 20-week interval, the estimated coefficient of the changes in speculative position is 
−2.389 for the 10% price changes, whereas the estimated coefficient is −7.180 for the 
20% price changes, a three-fold increase. This result indicates that speculation has more 
prominent stabilizing effects when there are larger commodity price movements. The 
estimated coefficients for speculators’ long and short positions are either negative or 
statistically insignificant, which suggests that there is no evidence that speculators’ long 
and short positions accentuate large price increases. The estimated result also shows that 
the coefficients on speculative long positions are either negative or insignificant, 
implying price increases tend not to occur during periods when speculators are buying. 
This result is in contrast to opinions among policy makers and practitioners that 
speculators accumulate long positions in commodity futures and therefore substantially 
affect prices. In terms of control variables, inflation has the most significant effect on 
commodity price increase; however, the effect is modest. 
       Panel B reports the cross-sectional analysis during the 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals 
for all commodities when prices decrease by at least 10% and 20%. The second, fourth, 
and sixth column present the estimation result when prices go down by at least 10%,
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during the 5-, 10-, and 20-week interval, respectively, and the third, fifth and seventh 
columns present the result when prices decrease by at least 20% for each interval. The 
results indicate that there is no significant cross-sectional relation between large price 
decreases and the changes in the speculative position in commodity futures: when prices 
go down substantially, it seems that speculators in the future market do not intensify large 
decline in the commodity prices. Compared to the results reported in Panel A, the 
stabilizing effect is less significant during periods of price increases. Instead, the changes 
in macroeconomic conditions have a stronger relation with price decline. Moreover, 
relative to price increases, there are fewer incidences of price decreases during the sample 
period. 
       At the bottom of Panel A and B, I also report the analysis for the 15 commodities 
with available inventory data. The results are similar to the results for all the 
commodities: speculators either have no effect or stabilize the commodity prices during 
periods of large price changes. In the process, I expected that inventory changes would 
have significant effects because, according to the theory of storage in commodity 
markets, inventory is directly related to price levels. However, I find that inventory 
changes generally are not significantly related to large price changes, and estimated 
coefficients on inventory changes are statistically significant only when the commodity 
prices continue to decline during each interval. Additionally, the relation between price 
decline and inventory changes is negative, indicating that prices decrease as more 
inventories are built up during the intervals. 
       Much attention has been paid to studying price changes in the energy and agricultural 
sectors (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; Irwin and Sanders, 2012b; Aulerich et al., 2013; 
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Brunetti et al., 2013). Although the sample size decreases, I provide additional analysis 
for these two sectors in the rest of Table 2.2. Panel C reports the analyses for energy and 
agricultural commodities when prices change by at least 10% during each interval. The 
left-hand side of Panel C reports the regression results when price goes up by at least 
10% during each interval, and the right-hand side presents the results when prices go 
down by at least 10% in each interval. The estimated coefficients of the speculative 
positions indicate that there is no evidence that speculators’ positions are related to the 
extreme price movements for energy commodities. Similar to what is reported in Panel A 
and Panel B, speculation seems to have stronger stabilizing effects when prices increase. 
Moreover, macroeconomic variables have more significant effects on price changes in 
case of price increases. Additionally, inflation has the most significant effect on price 
changes of energy commodities. Compared to the energy commodities, the seasonal 




       The results imply that futures speculation is not related to large price changes in the 
commodity markets. My analysis also indicates that extreme price increases tend not to 
occur during periods when speculators are buying, which is consistent with the 
interpretation that speculators’ trades alleviate rather than accentuate price increases. 
Additionally, economic fundamentals, such as inflation, are an important factor that 
influences commodity price changes, suggesting it is necessary to include marketwide 
information when studying the commodity market. 
                                                 
11
I also estimate the effect of futures speculation on commodity prices using the 20-week interval, obtaining 
similar conclusions.  
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2.6.2 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Spot Volatility 
       I assess whether speculators’ trading in the futures market destabilizes the 
commodity market using the conditional volatility model described in Eq. (2.2). In 
addition to analyzing the effect of speculators’ trading, I also examine how hedgers’ 
trading activity in the futures market affects spot volatility.
12
 Table 2.3 reports the 
estimation results. To conserve space, I only report the net effect of speculators’ and 
hedgers’ on spot volatility.13 I calculate the net effect of speculators and hedgers on spot 
volatility by multiplying the coefficient of each partitioned trading activity variable by its 
mean and sum up the resulting products. A negative or insignificant net effect implies 
that futures trading activity does not destabilize the spot market price. The net effect in 
bold indicates that it is significantly different from zero. For each trader type, F-tests are 
performed to test whether the coefficients of each partitioned trading activity are jointly 
zero. The bold numbers in Table 2.3 indicates the statistical significance of the net effect 
of each trader type at 1%, 5%, or 10%. 
       The net effects reported in Table 2.3 indicate there is no evidence that futures 
speculation destabilizes the spot price. For the full sample period, except for live cattle, 
the net effect of speculative trading is negative or insignificant. For energy commodities, 
the net effect of speculative trading is negative for the full sample period and for the two 
subsample periods. For all agricultural commodities except wheat, the net effect of
                                                 
12
 The recent working paper by Bohl and Stephan (2013) studies a similar question. However, they include 
only speculators’ trading activity and do not control for other variables that are relevant to spot volatility. In 
addition, the speculators' position is part of total open interest; therefore, Bohl and Stephan’s estimation 
controls for two redundant variables in the conditional variance equation. My method is different in that I 
do not include total open interest but instead include aggregate trading activity by speculators, hedgers, and 
small traders. Trading volume captures total trading activity in the futures market in my estimation. Last, 
by providing an analysis of market quality, I find stronger results, consistent across commodities. 
13
 The complete estimation results for Crude oil and Soybeans are reported in the Appendix 2.C. The entire 
results are available upon request. 
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speculators’ trading is negative during the post-2003 period. During the pre-2003 period, 
the net effect of speculative trading is negative or insignificant, except for soybean and 
live cattle. This finding is contrary to the view that speculators’ increased participation in 
the commodity futures market is the reason for the price fluctuations in the energy and 
agricultural markets in the last decade. Instead, speculators seem to stabilize the price 
volatility in the commodity market, especially during the most recent decade. In 
particular, speculators in the futures market are the center of a policy debate on the crude 
oil prices. I show that speculators actually help lower the volatility in oil prices. In terms 
of hedgers’ effects in energy commodities, the patterns are less clear than for those of 
speculators. In agricultural markets, the trading activity of hedgers seems to be more 
destabilizing than that of speculators. 
       The empirical analysis in this section suggests there is no evidence that speculators in 
the futures markets destabilize the spot market. Speculators in the agricultural and energy 
futures markets have been blamed for making pricing more volatile and unsustainable. In 
contrast, at least for the commodities I study, I show that speculators stabilize the 
commodity prices. These commodities are mostly liquid and are included in the two 
major commodity indices that reflect most speculative trading in futures markets. 
Particularly during the post-2003 period, there is no evidence that speculators are 
responsible for increasing commodity price volatility. My empirical findings indicate that 
futures speculation has a stabilizing effect, especially during the recent period, when 





   
2.6.3 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Market Quality 
       In this section, I examine how futures speculation affects spot market quality using 
Eqs. (2.8) and (2.11). The dependent variables are the Roll (1984) liquidity measure and 
the absolute value of (1-variance ratio). They are constructed using the spot price in 
nonoverlapping weekly frequency to mitigate the fact that they are persistent over time. 
In addition, the weekly measure coincides with the reporting frequency of the COT 
reports. To save space, I report only the net effect of each trader type.
14
 There is a strong 
time trend in the liquidity measure. Therefore, I regress the Roll measure on the time 
trend and use the residual as the dependent variable.
15
   
       Table 2.4 reports how futures speculation affects liquidity in the commodity market. 
The Roll measure gauges illiquidity; a higher Roll measure indicates lower liquidity. 
Therefore, the negative net effect implies that speculators’ trading in the futures market 
increases spot market liquidity. 
       The net effect of futures speculation is either insignificant or negative, indicating that 
speculative trading either has no effect or has a positive effect on liquidity. The same 
results are found regardless of the sample period. Clearly, speculative trading in the 
futures market does not lower liquidity in the commodity market; in fact, for some 
commodities, futures speculation improves liquidity in the commodity market. There is 
no clear pattern in the hedgers’ net effect. In contrast to the net effect of speculators’ 
trading, during the post-2003 period, the net effect of hedgers, whenever significant, 
tends to be positive. 
                                                 
14
 The full estimation result is available upon request. 
15
 It is possible that increasing speculation causes the time trend. I use the Roll measure without filtering 
the time trend and obtain qualitatively identical results. In fact, when I use the Roll measure without 
detrending, I obtain stronger results. 
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       Using the variance ratio test, I conduct a similar analysis to assess the effect of 
futures speculation on short-term price efficiency. Table 2.5 displays the result. The 
dependent variable measures deviations from the random walk benchmark over short 
horizons. Therefore, the positive net effect implies that futures trading by each trader type 
is negatively associated with the short-term price efficiency. Most of the net effect is 
insignificant, implying that the weekly variance ratio is a noisy measure. Although I do 
not find strong statistical power to establish a clear conclusion, during the post-2003 
period, it seems that speculative trading does not decrease the price efficiency, at least. 
This is important because it is during the post-2003 period that policy makers believe 
speculators harmed the market. For other periods, I do not find any clear pattern for the 
effect of futures speculation on market quality. Relative to speculators, the net effects of 
hedgers tend to be more positive. For example, for heating oil and live cattle, the net 
effect is significant and positive during the entire sample periods. 
       The analysis of liquidity and short-term price efficiency suggests that speculators in 
the commodity futures market not only stabilize the spot market, but also help maintain 
market quality. The results are consistent with stabilizing theory of futures speculation, 
supporting Working (1960) who argue that speculators benefit the market by providing 
liquidity and risk-bearing capacity for hedgers. 
 
2.6.4 Analysis Using the DCOT and CIT Reports 
       In this section, I provide additional analysis on how the trading activity of 
speculators affects spot volatility and market quality using the DCOT report. Instead of 
classifying traders as commercials and noncommercials as in the COT report, this data set
37 
 
   
provides more detailed information on the trader types. Although the data are available 
from mid-2006, the sample period is long enough to produce a stable GARCH 
estimation. Also, this period includes the time during which commodity markets 
experienced substantial increases in speculators’ participation as well as price 
fluctuations. The more detailed information on trader type can provide additional 
information on which types of traders destabilize the commodity markets. Using the 
DCOT report, I repeat a similar exercise on volatility and market quality. Each trader 
type’s position is partitioned into expected, unexpected, and long-term variation via the 
multivariate VAR model that I used previously. The control variables are also identical to 
those of previous analysis. 
       Table 2.6 reports the net effect of each trader type on spot volatility using the 
GARCH (1,1) model. Money managers and other reportables are comparable to 
speculators in the previous volatility analysis; among speculators, money managers hold 
greater positions in the commodity futures than do the other trader type. Product 
merchant and swap dealer groups are comparable to hedgers in the previous analysis. In 
all commodities, traders labeled as money managers have a negative or insignificant net 
effect on spot volatility. These types of traders are hedge funds or commodity trading 
advisers, representing the traditional class of speculators (Irwin and Sanders, 2010). In 
contrast, there is no clear pattern for the other type of speculators: the speculators who are 
categorized as “nonreportables,” it seems, are distinct from the traditional type of 
speculators in the futures market. 
       Among commercial traders, I do not find a systematic pattern for the product 
merchant trader type; for agricultural commodities, however, the net effect of this trader   
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 type is negative or insignificant, indicating that traditional hedgers in agricultural 
markets do not increase commodity price volatility. In terms of swap dealers, the net 
effect is significant and positive in all energy commodities, implying that these trader 
groups increase price volatility in this market. Swap dealers include (i) dealers who trade 
with speculators and use the futures market to hedge their risk and (ii) index traders who 
hold long-only positions in commodity futures. It is shown that index traders compose 
most of the swap dealers in agricultural commodity markets, but this distinction is not 
clear in energy futures markets (CFTC, 2008; Irwin and Sanders, 2010). There is no clear 
pattern for the effect swap dealers have on the agricultural markets. For wheat and sugar, 
the result indicates that swap dealers destabilize the spot market; for corn, however, swap 
dealers have a significant stabilizing effect on price volatility.
16
  
       In Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, I report the net effect of each trader type on liquidity and 
short-term price efficiency, respectively. Much as the previous analysis, the dependent 
variables are the Roll's liquidity measure and the absolute value of (1-variance ratio), 
both are at nonoverlapping weekly frequency. For the managed money trader type, I find 
negative or insignificant net effects on liquidity and short-term price efficiency for all 
commodities. For other reportables, I again find a negative and insignificant effect for 
energy commodities, but no systematic pattern for agricultural commodities. For 
commercial traders, I cannot reach a clear conclusion about their effect on liquidity and 
price efficiency, although I find weak evidence that the net effect is positive in terms of 
the product merchant group. For swap dealers, there is no clear pattern, either. 
       Overall, the analysis using the DCOT report suggests that the classical type of
                                                 
16
 Brunetti et al. (2013) report that swap dealers do not have a significant effect on market volatility in 
crude oil, natural gas, and corn using unique position data over 2005 to 2009. When I use the same period, I 
also obtain an insignificant effect on volatility for swap dealers. 
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speculators, such as hedge funds or floor traders, stabilize commodity markets and 
improve market quality. These traders seem to be informed traders, who provide liquidity 
and risk-bearing capacity for hedgers. Furthermore, the analysis partially indicates that 
swap dealers are the type of traders who destabilize the spot market. Swap dealers usually 
offer their clients an over-the-counter (OTC) product that mimics some futures-based 
index. The swap dealers are thus implicitly short in futures contracts arranged by an 
OTC, and hedge with an offsetting long position on organized exchanges that are 
reported to the CFTC. If the swap dealer trader type destabilizes the commodity markets, 
it is possible that index traders similarly destabilize the commodity markets. To assess 
this possibility, I conduct additional analysis using the CIT report. 
       The CIT report is available only for selected agricultural commodities beginning in 
2006. In Panel A of Table 2.9, I report the effects of futures trading on spot volatility for 
index traders, nonindex speculators, and commercial traders (hedgers) groups. The net 
effects of index traders on spot volatility are all negative or insignificant, indicating that 
the futures trading of this trader type does not destabilize the spot price. Instead, the 
destabilizing effect of swap dealers reported in the previous section seems to be driven by 
the nonindex traders included in the swap dealer category. 
       In Panels B and C of Table 2.9, I report the effect of index traders on market quality 
using methods similar to those I have used in the previous analysis. The net effects of 
index traders on liquidity and short-term price efficiency are all negative or insignificant, 
indicating that index traders in the futures market do not lower market quality in the 
agricultural commodity market. This result is consistent with the findings of recent 
studies that document that index traders do not cause price effects in the agricultural
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commodity market  (Stoll and Whaley, 2010; Irwin and Sanders, 2012b; Irwin and 
Sanders, 2012c; Brunetti et al., 2013). The findings that index traders do not destabilize 
the commodity markets seem to be robust to different methods among studies, including 
mine. 
       The analysis using the DCOT and CIT reports suggests that certain types of 
speculators, such as hedge funds and floor traders, have a stabilizing effect on the 
commodity market. Additionally, I find no evidence that index traders in the agricultural 
market destabilize commodity prices. Instead, I find that index traders in the futures 
market lower volatility and sustain market quality. This finding is important because it is 
popular perception that index traders make commodity prices too volatile.  
       Overall, using several publicly available position data from the CFTC, I find strong 
evidence that speculators lower price volatility in the commodity market. In addition, I 
show that speculators do not lower price efficiency, nor do they reduce liquidity, 
supporting the stabilizing theories of futures speculation. The results presented here are 
consistent with the analysis on price changes in the previous section that futures 
speculation is not related to large price changes. In addition, my empirical findings 
suggest that more detailed data on commodity futures trading can provide useful 
information about the effects of different types of traders on the commodity market. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
       In this paper, I assess whether futures speculation destabilizes the commodity 
market. I study periods during which prices rose or fell substantially, and assess in a 
cross-sectional analysis whether the magnitude of price changes is related to changes in
41 
 
   
speculative positions. As a sharp contrast to the public perception that speculators cause 
higher commodity prices, I find no such evidence. My analysis indicates that speculators 
either have no effect or dampen prices during periods of large price movement. 
Speculators seem to sell during periods of large price appreciation, consistent with the 
interpretation that speculators’ trades dampen rather than accentuate price increases. 
       I show that speculators in the futures market contribute to reducing spot price 
volatility, supporting the results of existing literature that futures trading activity 
stabilizes the spot markets. Contrary to the popular belief that increased futures 
speculation has been destabilizing the commodity market in the most recent decade, my 
findings show that speculators have a stronger stabilizing effect on commodity markets 
during the financialization periods. 
       In the analysis on market quality, I find that speculators provide liquidity and support 
short-term price efficiency in the commodity market, providing strong supporting 
evidence that speculators in the futures market benefit the commodity market. In 
addition, using detailed position data available from the CFTC, I document that more 
traditional types of speculators and index traders have a stronger stabilizing effect on the 
commodity market during the recent decade. 
       Finally, my study details useful policy implications. Recent policy changes aim to 
regulate speculative trading in the futures market to bring order to the commodity 
markets. My analysis suggests that these regulatory changes would not effectively reach 
the goal. In future research, I plan to extend my analysis to investigate the fundamental 
forces that drive commodity price fluctuations. 
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2.8 Appendix 
       In this section, I discuss in detail the results of GARCH (1,1) estimation reported in 
Section 2.5.2, and provide the complete estimation result for Crude Oil. The results 
reveal that the effects of futures trading activities and other conditioning variables on spot 
volatility are heterogeneous among the commodities, which is consistent with previous 
studies documenting that commodity futures are distinct from each other (Erb and 
Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). There are some common features, 
though. In the conditional mean equation, changes in the open interest are significant and 
positive in almost all commodity markets in all sample periods. Karpoff (1987) 
documents a positive relation between price changes and trading volume changes. Hong 
and Yogo (2012) also report the growth in open interest as a strong predictor of 
commodity returns. Inflation has significant effects for energy markets; however, these 
effects are not significant for most of the agricultural commodities. The changes in 
inventory are not significant in most cases, either. 
       In the conditional volatility equation, the estimated coefficient for future volume is 
positive for almost all commodities, consistent with the findings in Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1993). Also, the coefficients on nonreportables are always negative or 
insignificant for all commodities. I expected the changes in supply and inventory to lower 
spot volatility, but there is no clear pattern in these variables across commodities. 
Compared with agricultural commodities, macroeconomic variables are more significant 
for energy commodities, but this is expected because energy commodities are inputs for 
production, which is closely related to the overall economic condition. The negative sign 
of the macroeconomic variables implies that lower demand for commodities is negatively
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related to spot volatility in the commodity market. Although not reported, the seasonable 
dummy variables are significant for most energy and agricultural commodities that have 
different seasonal demand and harvest cycles. 
       In Table 2.10, I report the GARCH estimation result for Crude oil for the full sample 
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Table 2.1 Information on Commodity Prices and Commodity Futures 
 
This table provides information on commodities and their futures contracts. Panel A 
presents futures contract specifications, Panel B reports commodity price information for 
the full sample period and two subsample periods, and Panel C display the market share 
for each commodity futures contract. Panel B and Panel C display 15 commodities that 
have inventory data. The data span from October, 1992 to July, 2012. For natural gas 
futures, price data are available from November, 1993, and for lean hogs futures, the 
COT report starts in April, 1996. In Panel A, * indicates commodities with inventory 
data. The market share of speculators in the commodity futures market is calculated as 
the gross speculative position divided by twice the total open interest. 
 
      
Panel A: Futures contract specifications   




   Crude Oil* 1,000 Bbl All CME 
  Heating Oil* 42,000 Gal All CME 
  Gasoline* 42,000 Gal All CME 




  Wheat* 5,000 Bushels 3,5,7,9,12 CME 
  Soybean* 5,000 Bushels 1,3,5,7,8,9,11 CME 
  Corn* 5,000 Bushels 3,5,7,9,12 CME 
  Kansas Wheat* 5,000 Bushels 3,5,7,9,10 CME 
  Soybean Oil 60,000 Pounds 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 CME 




  Cocoa* 10 Metric tons 3,5,7,9,12 ICE 
  Coffee* 37,500 Pounds 3,5,7,9,12 ICE 
  Cotton* 50,000 Pounds 3,5,7,10,12 ICE 




  Feeder Cattle* 50,000 Pounds 1,3,4,5,8,9,10 CME 
  Lean Hogs* 40,000 Pounds 2,4,5,7,8,10,12 CME 
  Live Cattle* 40,000 Pounds 2,4,6,8,10,12 CME 
Metal 
     Gold 100 Troy oz. 2,4,6,8,10,12 CME 
  Silver 5,000 Troy oz. 1,3,5,7,9,12 CME 
  Copper 25,000 Pounds 3,5,7,9,12 CME 
  Platinum 50 Troy oz. 1,4,7,10 CME 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
 
                
Panel B: Information on Commodity Prices         
 
       Full Sample 
 
         Pre-2003 
 
        Post-2003 
  Mean Stdev   Mean Stdev   Mean Stdev 






































































Live Cattle 80.11 15.64   68.20 5.64   92.81 12.60 
 
 
Panel C: Speculators Market Share in Commodity Futures 
  Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
Crude Oil 0.24 0.13 0.35 
Heating Oil 0.17 0.11 0.24 
Gasoline 0.18 0.13 0.23 
Natural Gas 0.30 0.11 0.48 
Wheat 0.32 0.27 0.36 
Soybean 0.29 0.25 0.32 
Corn 0.25 0.19 0.30 
Kansas Wheat 0.20 0.13 0.28 
Cocoa 0.23 0.18 0.29 
Coffee 0.31 0.24 0.35 
Cotton 0.26 0.22 0.31 
Sugar 0.20 0.15 0.26 
Feeder Cattle 0.35 0.31 0.38 
Lean Hogs 0.34 0.28 0.39 
Live Cattle 0.31 0.24 0.38 
    
Table 2.2 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Commodity Price Changes  
This table reports the effect of futures speculation on commodity price changes (β in Eq. (2.1)). Panel A reports the cross-
sectional analysis of the 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals for all commodities when prices increase by at least 10% and 20% for 
all commodities and commodities with inventory data. Panel B reports the cross-sectional analysis of the 5-, 10-, and 20-week 
intervals for all commodities when prices decrease by at least 10% and 20% or all commodities and commodities with 
inventory data. Panel C reports the analyses for energy and agricultural commodities when prices change by at least 10% 
during the 5-, 10-, and 20-week intervals. %ΔTotal position is the % changes speculators aggregate futures position, %ΔLong 
position is the % changes of the speculators’ long position, and %Δ Short position is the % changes of the speculators’ short 
positions.  
                  
Panel A: The Effect of Futures Speculation on Price Increases         
 
           5-week intervals 
 
          10-week intervals 
 
            20-week intervals 
  10% increase 20% increase   10% increase 20% increase   10% increase 20% increase 
All Commodities 
          %ΔTotal Position −0.083  −3.356** 
 
  −0.052   −2.716* 
 
  −2.389***  −7.180*** 
  %ΔLong Position −0.035  −4.221** 
 
    0.312   −0.282 
 
  −0.110  −2.868*** 
  %ΔShort Position   0.376    0.516 
 
    0.804     3.802 
 
  −0.986    2.686 
Commodities with Inventory Data 
         %ΔTotal Position −0.317  −7.746 
 
  −0.006   −2.944 
 
  −2.396***    −8.708** 
  %ΔLong Position −0.233   −3.763* 
 
    0.397     0.438 
 
  −1.316    −2.698* 
  %ΔShort Position   0.549    4.036 
 
    0.836     2.927 
 








                                
  
Table 2.2 Continued 
  
 
              
Panel B: The Effect of Futures Speculation on Price Decreases         
 
           5-week intervals 
 
          10-week intervals 
 
            20-week intervals 
  10% decrease 20% decrease   10% decrease 20% decrease   10% decrease 20% decrease 
All Commodities 












  %ΔShort Position     0.292***       −2.159 
 
0.005      −0.018 
 
     −0.106 0.119 
Commodities with Inventory Data 




     −1.070 −0.298 




       1.140 −0.914 
  %ΔShort Position         0.382*  0.947 
 
     −0.034      −0.021 
 
     −0.095  0.737 
 
Panel C: The Effect of Futures Speculation on Price Changes  for Commodity Specific Regression 
  
             10% increase 
 
             10% decrease 
    5-week 10-week 20-week   5-week 10-week 20-week 
Energy 
          %ΔTotal Position −1.013* −1.126** −2.705* 
 
0.654   1.715   2.823 
  %ΔLong Position −0.830 −1.363* −0.227 
 
1.432   1.826   5.520 
  %ΔShort Position −0.329   3.405   1.457 
 
0.344 −0.172 −0.074 
Agriculture 
          %ΔTotal Position −0.166   0.021 −0.187** 
 
1.122   1.138   2.030 
  %ΔLong Position −0.382 −0.075 −0.141 
 
0.934   0.649   1.398 







                                
  
Table 2.3 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Spot Volatility 
This table reports the net effect of futures speculation on spot volatility. The sample period is from October, 1992 to July, 
2012, except for natural gas, for which the data start in November, 1993; lean hogs, for which the Commitments of Traders 
(COT) report starts in April, 1996; and coffee, for which the inventory data start in 1997. The net effect of speculators’ and 
hedgers’ positions is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of each partitioned trading activity by its mean value. The bold 
numbers indicate the statistical significance of the net effect for each trader type.  
 
    Speculators     Hedgers   
 
Full Sample   Pre-2003    Post-2003 
 
Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
Crude Oil     −12.348 −5.213 −22.360 
 
−0.423     2.432 4.414 
Heating Oil     −11.491 −6.905 −18.184 
 
-3.334   10.557     −7.359 
Gasoline       −8.574 −6.423 −14.130 
 
−0.145     3.816     −5.354 
Natural Gas       −1.055   −24.358 −23.792 
 
     12.128   13.017     36.999 
Wheat −5.767   −12.369  12.679 
 
1.812     8.412       1.565 
Soybeans −7.768  4.648 −22.650 
 
−6.526  −11.214       5.601 
Corn      10.816   −10.174 −22.946 
 
8.463     8.739     17.434 
Cotton       −3.712     −0.580   −9.310 
 
1.961     0.336       7.357 
Kansas Wheat −2.033     −4.048  −1.001 
 
3.707     5.382     14.995 
Cocoa −4.375  3.736  −9.000 
 
−1.636     0.725     −5.140 
Coffee −9.431     −5.092     −17.059 
 
−2.723     6.727     −4.341 
Sugar −2.017     −2.086     −24.864 
 
−5.223     4.111     21.353 
Lean Hogs 6.472      6.607       −0.069 
 
−5.920  −11.494       9.220 
Live Cattle      15.189    12.885   −9.214 
 







                                
  
Table 2.4 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Liquidity 
This table reports the effect of futures speculation on liquidity. Weekly nonoverlapping Roll’s (1984) liquidity measure is used to 
calculate liquidity. The sample period is from October, 1992, to July, 2012, except for natural gas, for which the data start in 
November, 1993; lean hogs, for which the Commitments of Traders (COT) report starts in April, 1996; and coffee, for which the 
inventory data start in 1997. The net effect of speculators’ and hedgers’ positions is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of each 
partitioned trading activity by its mean value. The bold numbers indicate the statistical significance of the net effect. 
 
    Speculators     Hedgers   
 
Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
 
Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
Crude Oil −3.256 0.883 −0.715 
 
4.952 −0.439 0.897 
Heating Oil 0.044 −0.062 0.116 
 
−0.148 −0.024 −0.188 
Gasoline −0.032 −0.193 0.020 
 
0.000 0.187 0.047 
Natural Gas 0.288 −4.401 −6.489 
 
−0.238 1.502 15.174 
Wheat 1.174 −26.235 −0.971 
 
−5.529 19.470 −3.735 
Soybeans −6.834 −1.929 −19.574 
 
4.293 −1.124 21.221 
Corn −3.798 −1.531 0.610 
 
3.431 −1.005 9.152 
Cotton −3.874 −2.137 −3.196 
 
5.197 0.448 12.667 
Kansan Wheat 0.678 0.622 0.634 
 
−1.070 −1.550 −0.338 
Cocoa 9.684 9.044 2.582 
 
−2.285 −7.051 −4.002 
Coffee −2.392 −1.625 −2.865 
 
2.889 1.373 4.155 
Sugar −1.637 −0.639 −3.614 
 
1.945 −0.399 5.361 
Lean Hogs 0.327 2.722 0.893 
 
0.133 −2.953 0.091 








                                
  
Table 2.5 The Effect of Futures Speculation on Short-term Price Efficiency 
This table reports the effect of futures speculation on liquidity. The absolute value of (1-variance ratio) is used to calculate the 
short-term price efficiency. The sample period is from October, 1992, to July, 2012, except for natural gas, for which the data 
start in November, 1993; lean hogs, for which the Commitments of Traders (COT) report starts in April, 1996; and coffee, for 
which the inventory data start in 1997. The net effect of speculators’ and hedgers’ positions is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficient of each partitioned trading activity by its mean value. The bold numbers indicate the statistical significance of the 
net effect.  
 
    Speculators     Hedgers   
 
Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
 
Full Sample Pre-2003 Post-2003 
Crude Oil 0.288 0.883 −0.715 
 
−0.232 −0.439 0.897 
Heating Oil 0.229 0.978 −1.155 
 
0.624 0.085 0.889 
Gasoline 0.064 −0.980 −1.315 
 
0.205 1.633 1.096 
Natural Gas 0.288 −0.450 −0.615 
 
  −0.226 −0.445 0.897 
Wheat 1.070 1.510 0.676 
 
−0.798 −0.912 −0.984 
Soybeans 0.840 1.072 8.670 
 
−0.481 −0.106 −0.618 
Corn −0.137 0.353 −0.345 
 
−0.172 −1.641 1.173 
Cotton 0.603 1.017 1.161 
 
−0.545 −0.850 −0.217 
Kansan Wheat 1.031 0.102 −2.634 
 
−2.643 −3.353 −5.251 
Cocoa 0.505 0.356 0.034 
 
−0.356 0.047 0.144 
Coffee −0.732 0.676 −0.586 
 
1.105 0.731 1.522 
Sugar −0.138 0.277 −1.446 
 
1.462 −0.280 1.537 
Lean Hogs 0.338 0.139 0.893 
 
0.287 0.047 0.091 






                                
  
Table 2.6 The Effect of Futures Trading on Spot Volatility by Trader Type 
This table reports the net effect of futures speculation on spot volatility by trader type. The sample period is from June, 2006, 
to July, 2012. The net effect of each trader type is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of each partitioned trading activity 
by its mean value. The bold numbers indicate the statistical significance of the net effect.  
 
  Product Merchant Swap Dealers Money Managers Other Reportables 
Crude Oil         −12.682  30.103 −26.626 −7.665 
Heating Oil             0.828  11.214 −51.588 −3.984 
Gasoline           −0.543  21.088 −7.481 −9.520 
Natural Gas         109.850  56.231 −26.941  7.231 
Wheat             3.785  3.739 −11.032         −24.121 
Soybeans           −0.323  1.960 −22.207 54.232 
Corn         −81.368       −139.119 143.098 91.567 
Kansas Wheat         −20.011  1.296 −5.854           −9.969 
Cocoa           −1.984  9.773 −44.646         −30.043 
Cotton           −6.184  7.575 −26.152  4.937 
Coffee           16.417           −4.905 −1.177         −14.305 
Sugar           14.319 33.587 −48.546         −11.410 
Lean Hogs             0.747  4.323 −13.152 13.296 








                                
  
Table 2.7 The Effect of Futures Trading on Liquidity by Trader Type 
This table reports the net effect of futures speculation on liquidity by trader type. Weekly nonoverlapping Roll’s (1984) 
liquidity measure is used to calculate liquidity. The sample period is from June, 2006, to July, 2012. The net effect of each 
trader type is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of each partitioned trading activity by its mean value. The bold numbers 
indicate the statistical significance of the net effect.  
 
  Product Merchant Swap Dealers Money Managers Other Reportables 
Crude Oil        −11.291 46.130         −5.445 −16.882 
Heating Oil 0.647 0.000 0.055 −0.268 
Gasoline 0.321          −0.231 0.146 −0.020 
Natural Gas 18.176          −6.738 0.346 −8.442 
Wheat 5.526 16.565         −8.466 −5.563 
Soybeans 74.157         −44.668        −13.213 −17.167 
Corn 10.979         −10.172 24.771 −13.653 
Kansas Wheat 3.682 5.542          −8.402 −8.800 
Cocoa 3.287          −3.154 −6.655 −3.046 
Cotton 12.227          −9.406 −5.199 −0.350 
Coffee 21.727 13.131 −6.732 −21.013 
Sugar          −6.505 13.417         −10.280  −1.022 
Lean Hogs 12.323         −19.651 8.697  9.688 






                                
  
Table 2.8 The Effect of Futures Trading on Price Efficiency by Trader Type  
This table reports the net effect of futures speculation on liquidity by trader type. The absolute value of (1-variance ratio) is used to 
calculate the short-term price efficiency. The sample period is from June, 2006, to July, 2012. The net effect of each trader type is 
calculated by multiplying the coefficient of each partitioned trading activity by its mean value. The bold numbers indicate the 
statistical significance of the net effect.  
 
  Product Merchant Swap Dealers Money Managers Other Reportables 
Crude Oil 1.405 0.096 0.919 0.286 
Heating Oil 5.715          −2.016        −0.419          −0.915 
Gasoline 1.198 0.121 0.382          −0.737 
Natural Gas          −8.641 −2.595       −10.127 21.803 
Wheat          −6.487 −5.591           4.846 13.098 
Soybeans 0.970 −2.940 1.471           −0.485 
Corn 11.253 6.314         −5.370          −12.644 
Kansas Wheat          −2.356 0.874 0.921 0.884 
Cocoa 0.624 1.615         −3.322 0.122 
Cotton          −1.602 1.570         −0.848 1.071 
Coffee          −2.017 1.628         −1.562 2.026 
Sugar          −1.243 0.732 0.335 1.592 
Lean Hogs          −0.023 0.055         −0.776 3.390 
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Table 2.9 Analysis Using the CIT Reports 
The table reports the effect of futures trading activity by trader types on volatility, 
liquidity, and short-term efficiency using the CIT report. The sample period is from 
January, 2006, to July, 2012. 
 
  Index Traders Speculators Hedgers 
Panel A: The Effect on Spot Volatility   
Wheat −5.193 13.587 −11.369 
Soybeans −14.668 17.179 −4.822 
Corn −10.351 −1.806 2.619 
Kansas Wheat   1.436 −18.600 17.825 
Cocoa −9.031 18.934 −4.038 
Cotton −42.646 8.723 15.983 
Coffee −2.600 −6.802 5.408 
Sugar −3.046 56.621 −29.744 
Lean Hogs −5.157  3.691 4.683 
Live Cattle  4.226     −20.034 6.175 
Panel B: The Effect on Liquidity   
Wheat  18.906  1.148  −9.697 
Soybeans −1.513  6.577  −3.571 
Corn  2.347 16.288  −1.714 
Kansas Wheat −1.336       −3.709  −4.139 
Cocoa   0.069 2.587  −4.371 
Cotton −3.394 0.629   1.961 
Coffee   7.659     −32.627  34.496 
Sugar −1.011 27.084 −25.514 
Lean Hogs −4.039 5.300  10.028 
Live Cattle   1.159     −18.053  23.158 
Panel C: The Effect on Short-term Price Efficiency 
Wheat −2.065 −3.200 −0.012 
Soybeans −1.064  0.013 −1.656 
Corn  1.147  1.481  0.084 
Kansas Wheat  1.132  1.033  0.954 
Cocoa −2.533 −4.176  1.521 
Cotton  1.657  1.493 −2.292 
Coffee  0.173  0.941 −1.361 
Sugar  0.227  1.087 −0.203 
Lean Hogs  1.301  3.011 −0.418 
Live Cattle −1.253 −0.623   2.220 
                                   61  
 
                                
  
Table 2.10 GARCH (1,1) Estimation Result for Crude Oil 
 
In this table, I report the GARCH (1,1) estimation results for Crude Oil. MA stands for 
long-term variation in the positions of each trader type. ΔOpen Interest is the daily 
change in open interest. ΔInventory and ΔSupply are the changes in the commodity 
inventory and commodity production level, respectively, using available data with the 
highest frequency. Futures Volume is the natural log of daily future volumes, and 
Nonreportables is the natural log of nonreportable positions. Inflation and Production 
Growth are monthly measures, and GDP is quarterly growth rate calculated with data 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). DTE is the square root of 




 stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Full Sample   Pre-2003   Post-2003 
Conditional mean 






























Constant   0.073 
 
  0.081 
 
  0.118 
Conditional variance 

















































   MA −0.423 
 
  0.183 
 
  0.315 

























ΔInventory   0.022 
 















Inflation  −0.385*** 
 
  0.059 
 
−0.029 








  0.081 
Constant    0.947   −22.019***     9.347** 
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Figure 2.1 Market Structure for Crude Oil 
Figure 2.1 describes the market structure for crude oil spot price and crude oil futures. 
Panel A displays the time series of spot price and total open interest. Panel B presents the 
time series of market share of speculators and hedgers in the crude oil futures market. 
 
           
 
 
                                
  




THE VALUE OF FIRMS’ VOLUNTRARY COMMITMENT  
                         TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY: THE CASE OF 







       This paper examines whether a firm’s commitment to increase transparency affects 
firm value and liquidity by studying firms’ voluntary decision to be listed in “special 
segments” created by Euronext. The empirical analysis finds positive valuation effects for 
firms that opted into the special segments and documents positive effects on the liquidity 
of these firms. In contrast, when similar market regulations are imposed on all listed 
firms and the segments become unavailable, I find marketwide negative valuation effects. 
The findings suggest that stock exchanges can provide an effective channel that improves 
firms’ liquidity and value; however, when a regulation with similar requirements is 




                                                 
17
 Reprinted from Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, Abby Kim, The value of firms’ voluntary commitment 
to improve transparency: the case of special segments on Euronext, 342–359, Copyright 2013, with 
permission from Elsevier. 
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3.2 Introduction 
       By using special segments created by Euronext, this paper examines whether a firm’s 
voluntary commitment to increase transparency affects its stock market liquidity and 
value. At the beginning of 2002, Euronext launched two special segments, NextPrime 
and NextEconomy, to improve listed firms’ transparency, thereby offering investors a 
broader menu of options in terms of firms’ disclosure policies. To be included in either of 
the segments, firms had to satisfy requirements related to corporate governance, liquidity, 
and reporting quality, in addition to abiding by the standard listing requirements of 
Euronext. Joining the segments was voluntary; therefore, when a firm decided to join a 
segment, it committed to self-regulation to enhance its quality. 
       When the two segments were subsequently discontinued, firms had to follow 
disclosure requirements similar to all firms listed on Euronext. The discontinuation 
occurred following the European Union’s Transparency Directive (EU TPD) (see 
Christensen et al., 2011, for detailed information), which mandated enhanced 
transparency and disclosure for all publicly traded firms in the European equity market. 
Consequently, this prevented firms from voluntarily distinguishing themselves by 
committing to high-quality standards. This event demonstrates how market responses to 
voluntary self-regulation and the effects of self-commitment by firms differ from similar 
mandatory requirements imposed as marketwide directives. I assess how the 
discontinuation of rules differently affects firms that adopted self-regulation and those 
that did not. 
       Unlike existing studies that focus on listing choices of firms (Doidge et al., 2004; Lel 
and Miller, 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Bris et al., 2012), I examine the effect of firms’
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efforts to increase transparency, given that firms already had to satisfy the listing 
requirement mandated by Euronext. The timing of segment creation followed the merger 
of Europe’s regional exchanges. By creating the two special segments, Euronext provide 
a cost-effective way for self-regulating firms to distinguish themselves from non-self-
regulating firms. Creating the segments was also to Euronext’s benefit because it allowed 
the exchange to attract firms and maintain its competitiveness by providing alternative 
mechanisms that provided firms an opportunity to appeal to a broader group of market 
participants. Another advantage of joining the segments was that firms enjoyed enhanced 
visibility via the introduction of two indices comprising the securities in each segment, 
which offered them the potential to attract more investors.
18
 Existing studies provide 
evidence for the positive effect of being included in the index (Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Shleifer, 1986; Chen et al., 2004). 
       Using this institutional setting, I investigate whether there are differential effects 
between firms that join the segments to improve transparency and those that do not put 
any additional effort into signaling their quality to the market. I assess whether there were 
positive effects on firm value when the exchange launched the two segments. The 
launching of a voluntary channel through which firms can commit to improving their 
quality is expected to be positive news for the market. Additionally, it is likely that a 
firm’s announcement that it is joining such a voluntary program is value-increasing news. 
Overall, my analysis shows that the decision to join the segments has a positive valuation 
effect for the firms that have committed to self-regulation. My results reveal a negative 
                                                 
18
 According to Euronext Annual Report 2002 (2002, p. 40): “The segment indices are capitalization 
indices, in which the weighting of each constituent is based on its total capitalization, subject to a 10% 
ceiling. Companies included in the Euronext100 index are excluded so that the indices reflect movements 
specific to the segments as precisely as possible.” 
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valuation effect when firms are removed from the exchange because they do not meet the 
requirements to stay in the segments. 
       I also conduct a difference-in-difference test to assess the effect of a firm’s voluntary 
self-regulation on liquidity. Comparing firm liquidity around the time the new segments 
were launched, I find that the liquidity, as measured by the yearly average of bid-ask 
spread and the proportion of zero-return days, improves more for firms that opted into the 
segments versus those that did not. One concern about this methodology is that the 
decision to be included in either the NextPrime or NextEconomy market segments is a 
firm’s endogenous decision. Therefore, the result may be driven by differences in firm 
characteristics that already exist. To mitigate the endogeneity problem, I use a propensity 
score matching method to form samples with similar observable characteristics. The 
relative differences in liquidity improvement between the two groups of the firms are 
valid after propensity score matching. 
Furthermore, I assess the valuation effect of firms while they were in the segments 
using the implied cost of capital and Tobin’s Q. Although there is a reduction in sample 
size, I find a lower cost of capital for firms that opted in and stayed in the segments 
compared to those that did not. Similarly, I find higher Tobin’s Q for segment firms than 
for nonsegment firms. This result implies that the positive effect of committing to 
improve firm quality continued after a firm has realized the initial benefits of liquidity 
improvement. 
       Last, using the segment discontinuation event, I examine the valuation effect when 
self-selecting opportunities became a mandatory requirement. I find negative valuation 
effects both for firms that were in the segments and for those that were not. One possible
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reason for the negative returns is that the discontinuation removed the tools that 
distinguished firms that commit to improve transparency and corporate governance from 
those that do not. When segments existed, it was easier for investors to recognize which 
firms put effort into improving transparency and accounting quality by checking which 
were included in the segments. Additionally, the segment indices increased the visibility 
of segment firms, helping investors distinguish between the two types of firms. With the 
segment discontinuation, this tool became unavailable to investors, making it difficult to 
differentiate between firms that had committed to improving firm transparency and 
reporting quality versus those that had not. The negative valuation effect for nonsegment 
firms implies that these firms did not opt in presumably because the marginal costs of 
joining the segments exceeded the marginal benefits. Although there were potential 
benefits to firm value and liquidity, joining the segments was not the optimal choice for 
these firms. 
       Additional difference-in-difference tests reveal that firms that did not opt in to the 
segments experience worsening liquidity relative to those that did opt in. Although the 
regression using the matched sample lowers the magnitude, the negative effect for 
nonsegment firms remains valid. This implies that the effect of mandatory regulatory 
changes observed around the segment discontinuation was not as effective as it originally 
was intended to be. Considering that the financial crisis hit right after the segment 
discontinuation, the result also implies that low-quality firms that did not invest in 
improving transparency previously were affected by market conditions more severely. 
       My empirical findings reveal the benefits of voluntary commitment to improve firm 
transparency, via exchange regulations that require increased firm disclosure and
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corporate governance, are also observed in well-developed capital markets. Existing 
studies focus on firms in less developed capital markets in which investor protection is 
weaker and the expected benefit of increased transparency is substantial (Dewenter et al., 
2010; De Carvalho and Pennacchi, 2012). In contrast, the empirical results I provide are 
more directly applicable to exchanges in well-developed, more integrated financial 
markets and potentially provide policy implications for effects of imposing regulations to 
improve transparency. 
My study provides new insight into which types of regulations are more likely to 
produce the desired results. I take advantage of the segments Euronext offered, which has 
a starting point and a period when a policy once voluntary became mandatory. My 
findings suggest that stock exchanges can provide an effective channel that improves 
firms’ liquidity and value; however, when a regulation with similar requirements is 
imposed on all firms in the market, the effect is less likely to be recognized, at least in the 
short term. Additionally, my results suggest that the intended outcome of marketwide 
regulation is not necessarily realized. This finding is consistent with Bushee and Leuz 
(2005), who document that once the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applied 
stricter disclosure requirements to all over-the-counter (OTC) firms, there was a 
substantial negative effect in firm value and liquidity for the firms that did not voluntarily 
comply with SEC rules previously. 
       I add to the literature by providing evidence that the increased transparency induced 
by firms’ voluntary disclosure and information production positively affects firm 
liquidity. This goes beyond merely finding a positive association between transparency 
and liquidity.  
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       The remainder of this article consists of descriptions of institutional background, the 
relevant literature that leads to hypothesis development, data description and sample 
construction, empirical methods and results, and conclusions.      
 
3.3 Institutional Background 
       At the beginning of 2002, Euronext created two special segments, NextEconomy, 
designed for companies related to technology sectors, and NextPrime, designed for 
companies active in traditional sectors, such as manufacturing. The intention was to 
provide an opportunity for firms, regardless of their size, to increase their visibility to 
investors. The exchange also indicated that the purpose of creating these two segments 
was to provide more liquidity and transparency to investors, thereby providing investors 
with more choices regarding a firm’s quality.  
       Any firm that is listed on Euronext could voluntarily join either of the two segments 




(i) Meet the liquidity requirement at the time of inclusion: continuous trading 
with or without the presence of a liquidity provider. 
(ii) Publish financial documents in English for shareholders and investors. 
(iii) Hold an analyst meeting at least twice each year and provide a description of 
the general policy on corporate governance in the annual report. 
(iv) Adopt international accounting standards (or reconcile existing information 
with those standards).
20
    
                                                 
19
 The information is based on Euronext Annual Report 2001, 2002 and Euronext Annual Factbook 2003. 
20
 Segment firms are required to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the 2005 fiscal 
year. 
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(v)       Publish quarterly financial report.21 
       To determine eligibility of a firm for inclusion in NextEconomy or NextPrime, the 
Segmentation Committee, appointed by Euronext, provided its recommendations, which 
include the future prospects and sustainability of the firm. The Committee also advised 
whether a firm should be removed from a segment because of its failure to comply with 
requirements specified in the Inclusion Agreement. Following the Committee’s 
recommendations, Euronext had the option of removing the firms from the segments. If 
certain requirements in the Inclusion Agreement were violated, firms could be removed 
without consulting with the Committee.
22
 A firm’s removal from a segment was made 
public in Euronext announcements, and the information in such announcements is 
available from the Euronext archive. Termination from the segment did not affect the 
listing status of the firm on Euronext. 
       Euronext actively promoted the two segments by holding meetings with investors, 
providing a specialized website and information for the segment firms, and organizing 
special road shows. In addition, Euronext created accompanying market indices, which 
comprised firms in each segment. The exchange also featured these firms in a special 
section of its website and provided detailed firm information to investors. These efforts 
provided an incentive for firms seeking more visibility and enhanced liquidity to join the 
segments. 
       On October 23, 2007, Euronext announced the discontinuation of NextPrime and
                                                 
21
 With the development of EU TPD, this was no longer a requirement but a matter of best practice from 
2004.  
22
 When a firm violated the conditions described in Article 11.1 (i), (ii), and (iv) of the Agreement, 
Euronext removed the firm without consulting with the Committee. For example, Euronext announcement 
2006-033 reports the removal of Athlon Holding N.V. from NextPrime: “In accordance with article 11.1 (i) 
of the Inclusion Agreement, the following company will be removed from the NextPrime segment and 
index with effect from 7 August 2006.” 
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NextEconomy segments and the accompanying indices.
23
 According to Euronext, 
termination occurred because of the EU TPD’s requirements for enhanced transparency 
and disclosure for all publicly-traded firms in Europe, making these special segments 
unnecessary. Four transnational market directives have been developed in Europe; TPD 
was the specific directive that focused on corporate disclosure and transparency. TPD 
was adopted in May 2004; however, each EU member country has the discretion to 
choose its own enforcement date.
24
 According to the rules mandated by TPD, all listed 
firms must adopt standards similar to those that were previously required for inclusion in 
the two segments. In other words, the discontinuation of NextEconomy and NextPrime 
prohibited firms from distinguishing themselves by voluntarily committing to these high-
quality standards. In addition, firms lost their increased visibility in the special index 
designed for the segments. 
 
3.4 Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
       Two channels through which firms can improve their transparency and information 
quality, thereby enhancing liquidity, are mandated regulation and voluntary disclosure. 
First, mandated capital market regulation can require firms to improve disclosure quality 
and market transparency. This mechanism is often imposed after a financial market
                                                 
23
 NYSE Euronext Corporate event notice: Suppression des segments Nextprime et NextEconomy 
(Termination of NextPrime and NextEconomy segments) reports that “Changes to EU regulations, more  
specifically regarding contents and deadlines for publications by listed companies following the 
Transparency Directive, entail that Euronext no longer needs to maintain the quality-based segments 
Nextprime and Nexteconomy, introduced by Euronext on January 1st, 2002 with the aim of meeting the 
highest standards in terms of communications. Certain requirements that applied at the time the companies 
were admitted, now apply to all listed companies under the new regulatory framework.” 
24
 The actual enforcement dates are provided by Christensen et al. (2011). They find that the effect of 
security regulation is more prevalent in countries where there are stricter implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms. Most of the actual enforcement dates for the countries in my study come after the 
discontinuation of the segments. 
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experiences a major corporate scandal. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a 
marketwide regulation, attempts to improve corporate governance and to increase 
transparency among firms through enhanced standards in reporting financial statements 
and auditing. A second channel through which firms can improve their transparency is by 
voluntarily providing information to their investors. In a theoretical model, Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) show that managers who commit to voluntarily disclosing information 
beyond what is mandated reduce information asymmetry and lower firms’ cost of capital. 
       Firms that commit to improving transparency and to providing high-quality 
information via inclusion of market segments reduce information asymmetry between 
firms and their investors. As modeled in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), less information 
asymmetry lowers trading costs and enhances liquidity. Previous studies establish a 
positive relation between firm liquidity and transparency (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Lang et al., 2012). Existing studies also support a positive relation between voluntary 
disclosure and liquidity (Brown et al., 2004; Ali et al., 2007). Consistent with the 
intuition of Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), these studies imply that managers increase 
the disclosure level to mitigate information asymmetry between firms and markets. 
Recently, Balakrishnan et al. (2013) document that managers can actively influence 
liquidity via voluntary disclosure. Using brokerage closures as exogenous shock to the 
supply of public information, Balakrishnan et al. construct a causal relation between 
voluntary disclosure and liquidity. 
       This is not the first study to use the segment creation in Euronext. Pownall et al. 
(2013) study the changes in accounting quality and liquidity for firms after the European 
stock market merger and document that the benefits of the merger only accrue to segment
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firms if they comply fully with the requirements to be included in the segments. I find 
similar results showing that the creation of NextPrime and NextEconomy has a positive 
effect on the liquidity of firms that opt into the segments. Pownall et al. focus on the 
effect of compliance with the requirement and an analysis on accounting quality. I focus 
on the valuation effects of joining the segments and examine the effects on liquidity. 
Moreover, I assess the valuation effect of firms while they were in the segments. I further 
examine announcement returns upon the discontinuation of market segments and analyze 
the effects on firm liquidity after the segments ceased to exist. 
       Two closely related studies use stock markets in less developed capital markets to 
examine the effect of local exchanges’ efforts to improve the quality of listed firms. 
Dewenter et al. (2010) study the competition between two regional Korean stock 
exchanges to increase their disclosure and governance standards, and they document that 
competition between the two resulted in more stringent rules and better protection for 
minority shareholders. De Cavalho and Pennachi (2012) study the Brazilian stock 
exchange, Bovespa, which created three premium exchange listings that held a higher 
listing standard for shareholder protection than do traditional listings. They find that the 
choice of these premium listings had a positive effect on firms in terms of trading volume 
and positive market reactions. These studies demonstrate that local exchanges can 
provide a mechanism for listed firms to improve firm quality via regulatory decisions to 
create a channel for credible commitment, substituting a firm’s cross-listing in exchanges 
with greater disclosure requirements.
25
 
                                                 
25
 For example, firms that cross-list in the United States are subject to SEC requirements and are likely to 
face legal ramifications if their behavior conflicts with shareholders’ benefits. By cross-listing in the United 
States, corporate insiders are restricted from diverting resources for their own discretion and expropriating 





                                
  
       Another related study by Gerakos et al. (2013) shows that firms listed on the London 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which has less a restrictive listing standard than 
does the regulated market, perform poorly compared to those listed on a more regulated 
exchange. In their study, the role of self-regulation falls to private entities, “Nomads,” 
who are selected by the firms. Their findings suggest that when the firm delegates the 
role of improving its quality to a third party, many aspects of the firm’s performance 
worsen. My study differs in that instead of moving the incentive of self-regulation to the 
private sector, as in Gerakos et al., firms had a self-selection opportunity to increase 
transparency within Euronext, and the exchange retained the regulatory oversight over 
listed firms. 
       The results of existing studies predict a positive valuation effect for firms that join 
the segments. My study looks at a situation in which a private exchange provides an 
opportunity for firms to increase information flow to the market and examines how a 
firm’s decision to take that opportunity influences its liquidity and value. Because 
voluntary inclusion in the market segments required actions that improve transparency 
firms that joined the segments should experience a positive market reaction and improved 
liquidity. However, the decision to join the segments also reflects the firm’s optimal 
choice for the level of liquidity and transparency. In my study, firms that joined the 
segments were already more liquid and had been operating in a better disclosure 
environment. In this case, being in the segments would have no additional benefits for 
firm value. Simply put, joining the segments can be used as a cost-effective tool for firms 
to signal their high quality that already existed. 




                                
  
regulation mandating higher reporting standards for all firms, liquidity should have 
improved for firms that had not joined the segments, and no significant changes should 
have occurred for firms that were in the segments. The reason is that because segment 
firms were already following the higher transparency standards, they would not have had 
to make any major changes. However, firms that had not joined the segments did have to 
make major changes to their reporting quality and transparency. Upon segment 
discontinuation, therefore, investors could expect higher quality information and 
enhanced transparency from firms not previously in the segments. Accordingly, the 
market should have reacted positively to the segment discontinuation announcement, and 
the firms not previously in the segments should have experienced greater improvement in 
liquidity than segment firms. The fact that Euronext decided to discontinue the segments 
implies that it expected the marketwide regulation to have effects similar to those brought 
about by the standards previously required of segment firms. However, marketwide 
directives mandating a higher level of disclosure could move firms away from value-
maximizing disclosure decisions, which would lead to a negative market reaction. 
Empirical evidence does not make a clear prediction of the effect of marketwide rule 
changes on firm value. Several studies investigate the effect of SOX on firm valuation 
(Engel et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2008), but the results are mixed, and the effect varies 
depending on firm size and degree of compliance. 
 
3.5 Data and Sample Construction 
       I use Euronext’s monthly statistics available on the NYSE-Euronext website to 




                                
  
codes (ICB), trading information, and countries in which firms operate.
26
 I obtain firm 
characteristics, information on reporting standards, trading volume, bid and ask prices, 
stock returns, and cross-listing information from Datastream. To be included in the 
sample, firms must not have been dropped within a year and should have data on yearly 
average of bid-ask spread, stock returns, trading volume, country information, and 
industry codes. In addition, firms with zero volatility are deleted from the sample. 
Furthermore, for the analysis around the segment introduction, each firm must have 
stayed on the exchange from 2001 to 2003. To be classified as a segment firm, the firm 
must have remained as a segment firm at the end of both 2002 and 2003 and not have 
been dropped from the segment. Similarly, for the analysis around segment 
discontinuation, firms must have stayed on the exchange from 2006 to 2009 and segment 
firms must have remained in the segments in both 2006 and 2007.
27
 
       A firm is categorized as a segment firm if it was marked as such by Euronext at the 
end of each year and if it stayed in a segment for at least 6 months within a year. A firm 
is dropped from the sample if it switched from a segment firm to a nonsegment firm. For 
the periods during which I analyze the effects on firm liquidity, only a small number of 
firms dropped or switched. Table 3.1 reports the number of segment firms during the 
periods segments existed. Panel A shows that except for 2004 and 2006, a small number 
of firms dropped from the segments.
28
 Furthermore, most of the firms that were dropped 
from the segments or switched do not meet the data requirements. As displayed in Panel
                                                 
26
 The monthly statistics are available from 2002, https://europeanequities.nyx.com/en/resource-
library/reports-and-statistics. For firm data before 2002, I rely on Datastream. 
27
 Relaxing some of the restrictions does not change the results. 
28
 Panel A shows that a large number of firms dropped from the segments in 2004 and 2006; however, I did 
not compare liquidity between segment and nonsegment firms for these periods. In addition, most firms 




                                
  
B, when firms are classified as segment firms, they remained in the segments in the 
following year as well. Finally, Panel C displays that firms are more likely to switch their 
membership in segments when they dropped from the segments in 2004 or 2006. 
      The liquidity measures are yearly mean bid-ask spread, median bid-ask spread, and a 
proportion of yearly zero-return days. These liquidity measures are chosen because the 
highest frequency data available in Datastream are daily frequencies. The bid-ask spread 
is calculated as (ask price − bid price) / ((ask price + bid price) / 2), and zero-return days 
are the number of zero return days divided by the total yearly trading days. Lesmond et 
al. (1999) propose zero-return days as a proxy for liquidity because investors trade less 
for illiquid stocks, which induces zero trading volume and zero returns. Both measures 
are widely adopted as liquidity proxies especially in studies using international firm data 
(Lang et al., 2012; Pownall et al., 2013). 
 
3.6 Empirical Methods and Results 
3.6.1 Analysis Around the Launch of Two Market Segments 
       In this section, I conduct an analysis of the introduction of NextPrime and 
NextEconomy. First, I examine how the market reacted to the Euronext’s announcement 
that it was launching two new segments. Next, I evaluate whether a firm’s voluntary 
decision to join the segment had an effect on its liquidity. 
 
3.6.1.1 Event Study 
 
      On December 18, 2001, Euronext announced that it would be launching two segments 




                                
  
the exchange released a list of 139 qualified firms that were included in  the two 
segments.
29
 These firms had already met the financial and liquidity requirements for the 
two segments at the time of the announcement. The announcement of the creation of two 
segments was likely to have been value-increasing news from shareholders’ perspectives, 
especially for firms included in the segments. Firms had to meet additional requirements 
such as enhancing transparency and corporate governance upon joining the segments, 
which are known to be related to greater firm value (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek et al., 
2004; Lang et al., 2012). Therefore, I expect the announcement returns to be positive, 
especially for firms initially included in the segments. 
       I use a market model to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 
the announcement date. I use Euronext100 index returns as market returns and (−256, 
−46) days before the announcement date as the estimation window. I construct daily 
returns using Datastream and include only firms with sufficient return data within the 
estimation window and around the event window (−1, +1). I calculate CARs separately 
for firms that were included on the Euronext list released on the announcement date and 
for the firms that were not included. 
       Panel A of Table 3.2 reports event-study results for the announcement day of the 
segment creation and the corresponding release of firm names initially included in the 
two segments. The two-day CARs for event window (0, +1) are 0.44% (p-value < 0.001) 
for firms included in the segments and −0.18% (p-value < 0.001) for firms not included. 
The positive announcement return for the included firms indicates that the market viewed 
inclusion in the segments as positive. The negative two-day returns for nonincluded firms 
                                                 
29
 I am grateful to the Euronext Index division for providing me with a list of firms the exchange included 




                                
  
contrast with my expectation. I expected the creation of the two segments to be good 
news to the market as a whole, including nonincluded firms, although I did expect the 
positive effect to be lower for nonincluded firms than for included firms. 
       The three-day CARs are, to my surprise, negative for both groups of firms, though 
insignificant for firms included on the list. This can be attributed to a large negative 
abnormal return on day -1. The negative return on the day before the announcement date 
possibly indicates that news of the announcement leaked, and the market mistakenly 
perceived it as bad news. It is also plausible that the market did not immediately realize 
the benefit of having such a voluntary program. Another possibility is that a marketwide 
negative shock affected all firms before the announcement date. Finally, the negative 
returns may be due to confounding effects from previous events. In December 2001, 
Euronext made several announcements before revealing the introduction of the two 
segments, such as a financial agreement related to the merger with BLVP (the Portuguese 
exchange organization) and a cooperating agreement with another trading facility.
30
 In 
addition, Euronext had just completed mergers with several European regional exchanges 
in the preceding year. The new environment may have created additional uncertainty or 
mixed signals about the exchange’s marketwide announcements. 
       To provide more specific evidence to corroborate the previous results, I conduct an 
event study using the announcements of firms added to the segments throughout 2002.
31
 
Unlike the marketwide announcement of segment introduction, the announcement dates 
differ for firms added to the segments during 2002, and I therefore examine the
                                                 
30
 Euronext Annual Report 2001 provides a detailed timeline of major announcements made by Euronext 
during 2001. 
31
 Again, the Euronext Index division kindly provided the names of firms added to the segments during 




                                
  
announcement returns across different event dates. Using a market model, I calculate the 
3-day CARs around the announcement dates of firms’ inclusion in the segments. Panel B 
of Table 3.2 reports that the 3-day CARs are 1.51% (p-value < 0.001), supporting the 
idea that adopting a voluntary program to enhance firm’s transparency is positive news to 
shareholders. 
       I conduct an additional event study to provide stronger support for the previous 
results. I collect all of the announcement dates during 2002 for firms that were removed 
from the segments for violating the specific conditions that allowed Euronext to remove 
firms without the recommendation of the Segmentation Committee. The removal 
announcements should have been negative news for the firms because they implied the 
firms were not meeting the standards required for inclusion in the segments. Moreover, 
these firms lost the visibility they had while on the associated market indices. Although 
there are a small number of such announcements, examining whether the market viewed 
the involuntary removal as value-decreasing news can provide additional support for the 
previous results. 
       Following a similar event-study method that I used earlier, I use a market model to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date. I use 
Euronext100 index returns as market returns and (−256, −46) days before the 
announcement date as the estimation window. I find that the CARs around the 
announcement of firms’ removal from the segments are negative and statistically 
significant. Panel C of Table 3.2 reports that the three- (two)-day CARs are −1.16% 
(−1.06%), with (p-value < 0.001) for both cases. This result suggests that investors 




                                
  
results. 
       Overall, the event-study results suggest that the creation and inclusion of the 
segments that were intended to provide investors with additional information and to 
enhance firms’ transparency and liquidity were value-increasing news to investors. 
 
3.6.1.2 The Effect on Firms’ Liquidity 
       Existing studies document that increased transparency is positively related to higher 
liquidity. Because voluntary inclusion in the segments requires actions that improve 
transparency, it is likely that a firm’s decision to join the segment has a positive effect on 
liquidity and therefore enhances a firm’s value. To examine this possibility, I conduct an 
analysis of whether liquidity improved for firms after joining the segments around the 
time the segments were introduced. First, I provide information about segment and 
nonsegment firms around the launching of the two segments. 
       Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for firm variables in 2001 around the time the 
segments were launched. In Appendix 3.A, I provide the definitions of all variables. As 
mentioned in the data section, I include firms that did not drop from the exchange from 
2001 to 2003, and I require that segment firms not switch their position in the segments 
during 2002 and 2003. Therefore, segment firms are those that decided to be in the 
segments in 2002 and 2003, and nonsegment firms are those that did not choose to be in 
the segments. All measures are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and firm variables 
are scaled by total assets when necessary. 
       The first two rows of Table 3.3 show that segment firms have narrower mean spread 




                                
  
Euronext. In addition, segment firms have higher trading volume; however, volatility is 
also higher for segment firms. These variables indicate that firms that are already liquid 
and have higher trading volume are likely to choose to be segment firms. Even though 
segment firms have better liquidity, firms choose to be in the segments presumably 
because there is a marginal net benefit to doing so.  
       The rest of Table 3.3 compares firm characteristics between segment and 
nonsegment firms. Segment firms are smaller in size than nonsegment firms, reflecting 
that the segments were intended to benefit relatively small and midsized firms (see 
Euronext Annual Report 2001, 2001). Segment firms also have higher market-to-book 
ratio and higher sales growth than those of nonsegment firms. This is expected because 
most firms included in NextEconomy operate in the technology sector, which has higher 
growth opportunities than that of other industry sectors. Segment firms also have higher 
leverage; however, other characteristics such as profitability and capital expenditure are 
very similar to nonsegment firms, on average. These firm characteristics show that 
smaller firms that are in need of more growth opportunity opt to join the segments, 
possibly to benefit from more visibility and lower information asymmetry. 
       The bottom part of Table 3.3 provides information related to the firm’s accounting 
quality, reporting standards, and cross-listing status. Following Dechow et al. (2010), I 
use measures of accounting quality such as the absolute value of accrual magnitude and 
the ratio of standard deviation of earnings to the standard deviation of operating cash 
flows for the past 3 to 5 years based on available data. There are no significant 
differences in these measures between the two groups of firms.  








 Being listed on multiple exchanges increases visibility to investors, affecting 
liquidity. Segment firms are listed in other major European exchanges more frequently 
than are nonsegment firms. Furthermore, I compare the reporting standard between the 
two groups. I obtain local accounting standard information from Datastream and measure 
the ratio of firms that use U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). I also calculate the ratio of firms 
whose auditor is affiliated with Big4 accounting firms. The accounting literature 
documents that these variables are closely related to accounting quality and corporate 
governance standards, which also affect liquidity (Fan and Wong, 2005; Lang et al., 
2012; Daske et al., 2013). Very few firms adopted the international standard in 2001, and 
there is no difference in this measure between the two groups. In contrast, segment firms 
use more auditors affiliated with Big4 accounting firms. 
       Another interesting point is that nonsegment firms have a higher ratio of ownership 
concentration than do segment firms. Insiders are expected to favor joining the segments 
only when a firm’s growth opportunities are sufficiently valuable. Considering that 
segment membership requires a higher level of transparency and corporate governance 
measures, it is likely that controlling shareholders do not have an incentive to join the 
segment. The higher growth opportunities of segment firms imply that one of the reasons 
a firm joins a segment is that there are high growth opportunities that offset the loss of 
insiders’ private benefits, a consequence of committing to provide greater transparency 
and improving corporate governance. 
                                                 
32
 Cross-listings in the United States are mainly via OTC in Datastream; therefore, I do not present a 
separate measure for U.S. cross-listings in the analysis. Additionally, the proportion of cross-listed firms in 
the United States is less than 5% based on Datastream. When I consider cross-listings in Germany only, I 




                                
  
       The cost of adopting new rules or marking extra efforts to modify reporting quality is 
a larger burden for smaller firms (Engel et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2008). As such, it is 
possible that the decision to join the segments is driven by firm size. However, given that 
segment firms are smaller, this concern does not apply here. Moreover, the comparison of 
firms’ accounting information suggests that segment firms are more often subject to 
higher reporting standards and have already adopted the tools needed to improve liquidity 
and corporate governance. Therefore, the net costs of adopting additional requirements to 
be included in the segments seem to be smaller for segment firms.   
       To examine whether there are differential effects on liquidity between segment and 
nonsegment firms around the segment introduction, I conduct a difference-in-difference 
test on firm liquidity. Specifically, I run the following regression: 
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 Post is a dummy variable equal to one for either year 2002 or 2003. The treatment 
groups (Treat  = 1) are segment firms and the control groups (Treat = 0) are nonsegment 
firms. I compare each group’s liquidity between 2001 and 2002 and between 2001 and 
2003. As explained in the data section, the liquidity measures are the bid-ask spread and 
the percentage of zero-return days. The bid-ask spread and zero-return measures are 
inverse measures of liquidity; therefore, a negative sign on the interaction term 
(Post·Treat) implies that being in the segments has a positive effect on firm liquidity. 
Control variables are firm size, volatility, cross-listing status, and firms’ reporting 
standards. I also include country and industry fixed effects. All variables are in yearly 




                                
  
       Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the difference-in-difference test results using Eq. (3.1) 
for 2001–2002 firm pairs, and Panel B reports results for 2001–2003 firm pairs. The first 
and fourth columns of both panels report the treatment effects without any control 
variables for mean spread and zero returns. The interaction term is economically and 
statistically significant, and the sign is negative. This implies that segment firms 
experience a more positive effect on their liquidity relative to nonsegment firms. The 
coefficient of Post is positive, implying that overall, the liquidity worsened in the 
following years, consistent with Pownall et al. (2013). The rest of the columns report 
regression results including other control variables. For both the 2001–2002 and 2001–
2003 comparisons, the interaction terms from the full specification remain negative and 
statistically significant, confirming the findings that liquidity improved more for segment 
firms than for nonsegment firms.  
       The coefficient of Volatility is positive, consistent with the existing literature, which 
documents a positive relation between liquidity and volatility (Ho and Stoll, 1983; Stoll, 
2000). The coefficient on Size is also negative and significant, indicating that smaller 
firms have lower liquidity. Furthermore, the sign of Cross-listing is negative, implying 
that being traded in multiple exchanges is positively correlated with liquidity. The 
negative coefficient for Reporting indicates that better reporting standards have a positive 
effect on liquidity.
33
 The effects of the control variables are consistent with existing 
studies using international data (Lang et al., 2012; Daske et al., 2013).  
       As Table 3.3 shows, there are differences in some of the firm characteristics such as 
volatility, trading volume, size, growth opportunities, and several variables related to
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 I use either Accounting Standard or Audit for the reporting variable. The results do not vary qualitatively 




                                
  
accounting quality.  Therefore, the difference in changes in liquidity of segment firms 
relative to nonsegment firms may capture some of the differences in firms’ observable 
characteristics that influence the outcome. To mitigate the endogeneity problem, I use the 
propensity score matching method described in Heckman et al. (1998).
34
 For each firm, I 
estimate the predicted probability of being in the segment in both 2002 and 2003 based 
on observable firm characteristics in 2001, using the following probit model: 
0
1






        
       The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for segment firms, and 
zero otherwise. Control variables are trading volume, firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
sales growth rate, profitability, leverage, dummy variables indicating the use of leading 
auditors, cross-listing status, and the accounting standard of the country in which the 
firms is operating.
35
 Country and industry fixed effects are also included. In addition, I 
include changes in liquidity between 2000 and 2001 to capture the trend in liquidity for 
each firm.
36
 To use the difference-in-difference regression, the parallel trend assumption 
should be met. Table 3.3 reveals that there is a significant difference in changes in 
liquidity over the preceding years; therefore, the difference-in-difference estimators may  
overestimate the effect on liquidity if the parallel trend assumption is invalid. As such,
                                                 
34
 This method is used to mitigate endogeneity issues in the corporate finance literature. Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010), Bharath et al. (2011), and Saretto and Tookes (2013) are examples of recent studies using 
the propensity matching method. 
35
 Similar to the methodology used in Bharath et al. (2011) and Pownall et al. (2013), the dependent 
variables in the difference-in-difference regression (i.e., mean spread and zero-return days) are not included 
in the probit model. The main purpose of the liquidity analysis is to compare the effect of being segment 
firms on the changes in liquidity relative to nonsegment firms; therefore, it is not necessary to match the 
level of liquidity before the introduction of the segments on Euronext. In fact, the segment firms already 
have narrower spread and a fewer number of zero-return days than do nonsegment firms. The purpose and 
interpretation of the difference-in-difference regression are different from other studies that match the level 
of dependent variables (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010; Saretto and Tookes, 2013). 
36




                                
  
my matched firms are not only similar in firm characteristics but also in liquidity trend 
before the segments started. After estimating the propensity score for each firm, I use the 
nearest-neighbor matching method to obtain a matched firm pair. To be more specific, for 
each segment firm, I find a nonsegment firm with the smallest absolute differences in its 
estimated propensity score. This procedure gives me 161 pairs of matched firms. In Table 
3.5, I report the result of probit estimation, summary statistics for the matched sample, 
and the result of difference-in-difference test for the matched sample. 
       Panel A of Table 3.5 reports the probit estimation used in the matching process and 
Panel B reports the sample statistics for the matched pair. All t-statistics confirm there are 
no differences in the observable firm characteristics. Panel C reports the difference-in-
difference regression results using the matched samples employing the full specifications. 
The coefficient on the interaction term remains negative. Although the statistical 
significance decreased compared to what is reported in Table 3.4, there is a clear positive 
effect on firm liquidity for segment firms.  
       Overall, the results from the difference-in-difference regression for both the full and 
matched samples demonstrate that segment firms experience improvements in firm 
liquidity after they join the segments. When exchanges provide an opportunity for firms 
to signal their high quality to investors, firms can benefit from their decision to do so. 
 
3.6.2 Analysis of Segment Firms While Staying in the Segments 
       The results from the previous section show that the decision to join the segments has 
a positive effect on firm value and its liquidity. If the positive effect is sustained for 




                                
  
the segments. I measure the firm value using the implied cost of capital and Tobin’s Q. I 
construct a data set comprising all firms from 2002 to 2007 that did not drop from the 
exchange. I also define segment firms as those that stayed in the segments for the entire 6 
years. This process gives a total of 700 firms, with 167 segment firms before applying 
any data restrictions. 
       I first examine whether segment firms had lower required returns by estimating the 
implied cost of capital. As discussed in the accounting literature, there is no consensus on 
which method should be used to estimate the implied cost of capital (Gebhardt et al., 
2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Lee et al., 2009; Hou et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013): 
alternative methods differ in dealing with the terminal value of future cash flows. Among 
the alternatives, I use the Easton’s (2004) price-earnings-growth (PEG) model, which 
assumes zero growth in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon. Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) and Easton and Monahan (2005) document that the PEG model is more 
robust than other alternatives in reflecting risk characteristics. Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005) assess how well the alternative estimates of cost of capital relate to firm-specific 
risk and show that the cost of capital calculated based on the PEG model is robust to 
model specification and produces results that are consistent with the predictions of 
existing theories.
37
 Other alternatives are shown to be unstable and the direction of the 
relation with risk characteristics is the opposite to those predicted in existing theories. 
Moreover, the PEG model has fewer data restrictions than do other methods for the 
sample of European firms I use in estimating the cost of capital. 
       For each firm, I calculate the cost of capital using the following PEG model:    
                                                 
37
 Botosan and Plumlee (2005) document that the estimate developed in Botosan and Plumlee (2002) is 
another robust measure of cost of equity capital. I adopt the Easton (2004) method considering the popular 








Cost of equity capital                            (3.3)t tt
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epst+1 and epst+2 are the analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share for 1 and 2 years, 
respectively, and P0 is the current price level. Analysts’ forecasts are obtained from the 
international I/B/E/S database, and other firm variables are from Datastream. I hand- 
collect CUSIP to match the analysts’ forecasts and Datastream and verify that the 
company name is identical between the two datasets. 
       After calculating the cost of capital, I examine whether firms in the segments have a 
lower cost of capital using the following panel regression: 
, 1 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 ,
Cost of capital Segment Volatility Size Leverage
                              + Sales Growth Book-to-market Capex                (3.4)
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Segment is a dummy variable that equals to one if firms are defined as segment firms in 
the sample from 2002 to 2007. Following existing studies, I include volatility, firm size, 
leverage, sales growth, book-to-market, and capital expenditure as control variables 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Easton and Monahan, 2005; Lee et al., 2008; Lee et al., 
2009). I also control for country, industry, and year fixed effects and cluster at the firm 
level following Petersen (2009).
38
 I require all firms to have the required data; therefore, 
the sample size decreases to 109 nonsegment firms and 55 segment firms each year for 
the 6 years while the segments existed on Euronext.
39
 On the left side of Table 3.6, I 
report the regression results for implied cost of capital. Controlling for firm 
characteristics and several fixed effects, the coefficient on segment (γ) is negative and
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 Petersen (2009) suggests that when multiple effects are present in the sample, standard errors can be 
clustered on one dimension and dummy variables can be included to control for other dimensions. 
39
 Lang et al. (2012) use both Tobin’s Q and the cost of capital as measures of firm value in the 




                                
  
significant at the 10% level. This result indicates that segment firms had lower costs of         
capital while they were in the segments. In terms of other control variables, large firms 
with higher growth opportunities have a lower cost of capital. In addition, consistent with 
existing studies, the cost of capital is positively related to volatility, leverage, and book-
to-market ratio. 
       Although this result shows that the implied costs of capital are lower for segment 
firms, the result is suggestive. Because of the availability of analyst forecast data and 
other firm-related variables, a significant number of firms are dropped in the estimation 
process, lowering the statistical significance. As an alternative measure of firm value, I 
use Tobin’s Q and examine the relation between being in the segments and firm 
valuation. Tobin’s Q is constructed as [(book value of assets + (market value of equity − 
book value of equity)) / book value of assets], using firm information obtained from 
Datastream. I use the following equation to assess the effect of being in the segments on 
Tobin’s Q: 
, 1 0 , 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 , 5 ,
           Tobin's Q Segment Size Leverage
                                Sales Growth + Cash Capex                           (3.5)
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Segment is a dummy variable that equals to one if firms are defined as segment firms in 
the sample from 2002 to 2007. I include control variables used in the prior studies, and 
country, industry, and year fixed effects, clustering at the firm level. Following Petersen 
(2009), robust standard errors clustered by firm level. The right-hand side of Table 3.6 
shows the coefficient on Segment (λ) is positive and significant, suggesting that firms that 
decided to join and stayed in the segments experienced higher firm value while they were 




                                
  
assess firm value increases the sample size substantially. 
       Although there are data restrictions, and therefore the results are suggestive, the 
analysis in this section shows that firms had lower cost of capital and higher firm value 
measured in Tobin’s Q while they were in the segments. Combined with the effect on 
liquidity discussed in the previous section, a firm’s decision to join the segments is value 
increasing to investors. The evidence suggests that an exchange’s effort to enhance 
transparency and a firm’s voluntary effort to take advantage of such a channel have a 
positive effect on a firm’s liquidity and value. Moreover, the empirical results suggest 
that the mechanism a private exchange provides to improve firm quality is effective even 
in a well-developed European market in which higher listing standards are already 
present compared to capital markets in developing countries. 
 
3.6.3 Analysis Around Segment Discontinuation 
       In this section, I examine the valuation effects and the effect on liquidity when 
Euronext discontinued the two segments at the end of 2007. Specifically, I analyze the 
announcement effects of discontinuing the segments and compare firms’ liquidity 
between 2007 and 2008 and between 2007 and 2009. The reason for ending the segments 
was that the requirements for TPD were very similar to the standards for the two 
segments. Therefore, for segment firms, the ability to distinguish themselves from other 
firms disappeared, making the segments redundant. TPD was first passed in December 
2004. Several adjustments were made after that, and finally, its implementing directive 
was enacted in March 2007. Each country could use its own discretion in enforcing the 




                                
  
and early 2008. The two market segment indices were deleted at the same time the 
segments were discontinued, and therefore investors may have noticed the disappearance 
of the indices. The crucial point is to investigate what happened to liquidity when (1) the 
two segments were discontinued because they were redundant of the newly implemented 
marketwide regulation and (2) the visibility via the customized indices disappeared. In 
addition, it is the enforcement that drives the actual changes for firms rather than the 
passge of transnational law. For this reason, I compare periods before and after the 
segment discontinuation. 
       Discontinuation of the segments coincides with the intention to require all firms in 
the stock exchanges to adopt standards to increase firm transparency and enhance 
accounting quality similar to standards already adopted by segment firms. Therefore, I 
expect to observe positive valuation effects and liquidity improvement for firms that were 
not included in the segments previously. However, for firms that were previously 
included in the segments, I expect to observe no announcement effects because these 
firms already had been making the effort to increase transparency and improve reporting 
quality as required by the segments. 
       Table 3.7 provides summary statistics for firms at the time of segment 
discontinuation. Similar to what is reported in Table 3.3, segment firms have lower bid-
ask spread and fewer zero-return days relative to nonsegment firms. Segment firms also 
have greater trading volume and number of trades but lower volatility than do 
nonsegment firms. The bid-ask spread and the ratio of zero-return days were smaller than 
what is reported in Table 3.3: over time, the trading cost decreased, and Euronext unified 




                                
  
for the firms listed on the exchange. Compared to nonsegment firms, segment firms are 
smaller and more levered. Segment firms are more profitable and have higher growth 
opportunity (in median value). Additionally, segment firms are cross-listed more often 
than are nonsegment firms. Compared to the accounting standards reported in Table 3.3, 
more than 90% of all firms adopted IFRS or the U.S. GAAP, and segment firms use 
international reporting standards to a greater extent than do nonsegment firms. This 
shows that firms that joined segments were more likely to adopt more stringent reporting 
standards, which Euronext required for segment firms. 
       To understand how the market responded to the announcement of segment 
discontinuation, I use an event-study method to calculate announcement returns. I adopt a 
market model similar to the analysis in section 3.6.1.1.. Table 3.8 reports the results. 
       Contrary to my expectations, for both segment and nonsegment firms, the CARs 
around the time of the announcement are negative and significant, and for segment firms, 
the CARs are more negative. This is surprising because the purpose of the 
discontinuation was to impose similar requirements on all firms to enhance transparency 
and quality. Therefore, I expected insignificant abnormal returns for segment firms and 
positive returns for nonsegment firms. Because the standards required for segment firms 
became mandatory for all firms, which brought about the exchange’s decision to cease 
the segments, I expected the market to see the discontinuation as positive news that 
expands the transparency requirements to all firms traded on Euronext, especially for 
nonsegment firms. Thus, it is surprising that the market responded negatively for both 
segment and nonsegment firms. 




                                
  
tools that distinguish firms with better transparency and corporate governance from the 
rest. When segments existed, it was easier for investors to recognize which firms put an 
effort into improving transparency and accounting quality by checking which were 
included in the segments. Additionally, the indices dedicated to the segments increased 
segment firms’ visibility, helping investors distinguish between the two types of firms. 
With segment discontinuation, this tool became unavailable to investors, making it 
difficult to differentiate firms that had committed to improving firm transparency and 
reporting quality from those that had not. Furthermore, being included in the segments 
was a firm’s voluntary decision, made because there were marginal benefits to doing so. 
If marketwide regulations remove firms’ opportunities to obtain the benefits accrued to 
them and if such regulation removes selection tools for investors, the market would 
respond negatively to the Euronext announcement. 
       Analyses from previous sections indicate that firms experienced positive effects on 
firm value by choosing to be in the segments. Therefore, when regulations similar to the 
segments’ requirements are imposed on all firms, the positive effect also likely accrues to 
nonsegment firms. The negative valuation effect for nonsegment firms presumably 
occurred because these firms were already operating at their optimal level of liquidity and 
transparency. It is possible that nonsegment firms did not opt in because the marginal 
costs of joining the segments exceeded marginal benefits. The negative valuation effect 
for nonsegment firms is consistent with the findings of Engel et al. (2007) and Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012). These studies document that when new regulations are imposed, the 
valuation effects are closely related to the firms’ costs and benefits of implementing the 




                                
  
levels. 
       In assessing the effect of segment discontinuation on firm liquidity, I conduct a 
difference-in-difference test between the two types of firms. After 2007, standards similar 
to those previously required for segment firms were applied to all firms; therefore, I 
expected to observe a positive effect of segment discontinuation on liquidity for the firms 
that were not included in the segment previously. Specifically, I use the following 
regression:             
, 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
, ,
1
                    Liquidity Post Nonseg Post Nonseg               (3.6)
                                       Controls (Fixed effects) +  
i t i t i t i t i t
N
i i t i t
i
   
 

    
 
 
       Nonseg is a dummy variable equal to one for the firms that were not segment firms 
previously and had to adopt the mandatory requirements, and Post is a dummy variable 
equal to one for either year 2008 or 2009. Control variables are identical to those reported 
in Table 3.4. The first three columns of Table 3.9 report the results from the difference-
in-difference regression between 2007 and 2008, and the last three columns report the 
regression results between 2007 and 2009. The results from the full-sample tests show 
that after the discontinuation of the segments, there was a negative effect on firm 
liquidity for nonsegment firms. The interaction terms are positive, which means that for 
nonsegment firms, the bid-ask spread widened and the number of zero-return days 
increased relative to segment firms. This is puzzling because nonsegment firms are now 
subject to greater disclosure and improved transparency due to marketwide regulation; 
therefore, they should experience more positive returns than segment firms that were 
already abiding by the requirements. 




                                
  
follow different reporting standards. Therefore, the regression results from the full 
sample may capture differences in firm quality. To reduce this endogeneity, I employ 
propensity score matching to control for the firms’ differences. The matching procedure 
is similar to the one used in section 3.6.1.2: firm characteristics, fixed effects, and 
liquidity trend variables are included in the probit equation. Using the probit model 
described in Eq. (3.2), I estimate the probability of firms being in the segments in 2007 
given the firms’ characteristics in 2006, and firms are matched using the absolute 
differences in propensity score.
40
 As reported in Panel A of Table 3.10, there is no 
significant difference in matched firm characteristics.  
       In Panel B of Table 3.10, I report results from the difference-in-difference test using 
a matched sample. Compared to the full-sample tests, the statistical significance 
disappears for zero returns, although the sign of the interaction terms remains positive. 
All other control variables have the expected signs, although the significance of reporting 
standards disappears in the matched-sample regression. The regression results indicate 
that the effect of mandatory regulation observed around the time of the segment 
discontinuation is not as meaningful as it was originally intended to be. It is also possible 
that firms that did not invest in improving firm quality previously are affected by market 
conditions more severely, given the fact that the market experienced a financial crisis 
during the period used in this regression. Additionally, improving firms’ disclosure 
practices may take time to develop, and the effect on market liquidity may manifest over 
a longer period. 
       Overall, the effect of the segment discontinuation had a negative effect on the firms 
listed on Euronext. Although the reason behind segment discontinuation was that
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 marketwide regulation that replaced the rules provided by the segments would bring 
similar positive outcomes for all firms listed on Euronext, the actual outcome turned out 
to be different from what was expected. The existence of segments has been a way for 
better firms to differentiate themselves from the rest, and when this separating tool 
disappeared because of the alternative mandatory regulation, the market responded 
negatively. Furthermore, the effect of marketwide regulation that is similar to the 
standards for the segments firms does not seem to be effective. After the segments were 
discontinued, there was no positive effect on the liquidity of nonsegment firms. The 
results provide insights into whether an individual firm’s voluntary decision to signal its 
quality to the market contributes to enhanced liquidity, compared to the case where 
improved transparency is mandatory for all listed firms. 
       Taken together, the results suggest that when firms voluntarily commit themselves to 
improving transparency through the channels provided by the exchange, positive effects 
on firm value and liquidity occur. However, when such channels disappear and 




       In this paper, I study the effect of transparency on a firm’s value and liquidity using 
the introduction and discontinuation of the NextPrime and NextEconomy market 
segments on Euronext. I document positive valuation effects for the firms that opted into 
the segments and committed to enhance transparency and improve reporting quality. The 




                                
  
liquidity improved compared to firms that did not join the segments. These results 
suggest that transparency affects firm liquidity, which is consistent with the findings of 
existing literature. 
       When similar market regulations are imposed on all listed firms and replace the 
functions of the voluntary market segments, results reveal negative valuation effects for 
all firms. In addition, firms that did not join the segments experienced lower liquidity 
compared to those that joined segments, even after the segments discontinued. A 
marketwide regulation that mandates similar requirements does not seem to yield the 
expected outcomes when similar channels provided by a local exchange are eliminated. 
       My empirical results provide several interesting insights. First, the benefit of 
exchanges’ provision for firms to improve transparency is not confined to developing 
financial markets but is also applied to more developed financial markets, where the 
effect of bonding mechanisms is not clearly a priori relative to less developed financial 
markets. Second, my results suggest which types of rules and regulations are more likely 
to produce their intended outcome. It seems that firms’ self-regulation to improve 
transparency is more effective than is marketwide mandatory regulation. Finally, this 
study documents that improved transparency affects liquidity, providing strong support 
for the positive relation between transparency and liquidity. 
 
3.8 Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Accmag: The absolute value of the difference between earnings and operating cash flows 
divided by total assets. 
 
Acc. Standard: A dummy variable equal to one if the country where the firm is operating 




                                
  
Accratio: The ratio of standard deviation of earnings to the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows during the past 3 to 5 years. 
 
Auditor: A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is using auditors affiliated with Big4 
auditing firms. 
 
Book-to-Market: The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
 
Cash: Cash and cash equivalent items divided by total assets. 
 
Capex: Capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
 
Cross-listing: A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is cross-listed in Germany or the 
United States. 
 
Div: A dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays dividend. 
 
Insider: The percentage of closely held shares. 
 
Leverage: Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
 
Ln (Volume): The natural log of trading volume. 
 
Mean (Median) Spread: The yearly average (median) of daily percentage bid-ask spread. 
 
Mtb: The ratio of market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
 
Nonseg: A dummy variable equal to one for the firms that were not segment firms 
previously upon the discontinuation of the two segments. 
 
%ΔSpread_01: The rate of change for mean spread between 2000 and 2001. 
 
%ΔZero_01: The rate of change for zero-return days between 2000 and 2001. 
 
%ΔSpread_56: The rate of change for mean spread between 2005 and 2006. 
 
%ΔZero_56: The rate of change for zero-return days between 2005 and 2006. 
 
Reporting: A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a high-quality reporting standard. 
I use either Acc. Standard or Auditor in the difference-in-difference regression for this 
variable. Using either of the two variables does not change the result qualitatively.  
 
Roe: Return on equity.  
 





                                
  
Size: The natural log of total assets. 
 
Post: A dummy variable equal to one for either year 2002 or 2003 (2008 or 2009) for the 
analysis around the segment introduction (discontinuation).   
 
StdE: The earnings volatility calculated using available earnings data for the previous 5 
years. 
 
Trade: The natural log of number of trades.    
 
Treat: A dummy variable equal to one for segment firms.        
 
Volatility: The annualized standard deviation of daily returns. 
 
Zero: Number of zero-return days divided by total number of trading days. 
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Table 3.1 Number of Segment Firms in Euronext 
 
This table displays the number of firms included in the NextEconomy and NextPrime 
segments of Euronext from 2002 to 2007. Firms that are dropped from Euronext are not 
included. The statistics presented here are the number of firms before the data restrictions 
used in the analysis were applied. Panel A shows the number of firms that stayed in the 
segments at least 1 month each year and the number of firms that dropped from the 
segments. Panel B reports firms that stayed in the segments in year t and dropped in year 
t+1. Panel C presents the statistics of firms that switched after they chose to be in the 
segments the previous year. The data are obtained from Euronext monthly statistics 
available from https://europeanequities.nyx.com/en/resource-library/monthly-statistics. 
              
Panel A: Number of segment firms each year     





























2007 92   108     4 
Panel B: Number of segment firms dropped between years   
     Segment firms in 2002 and not in 2003 
  
1 
     Segment firms in 2003 and not in 2004 
  
1 
     Segment firms in 2004 and not in 2005 
  
0 
     Segment firms in 2005 and not in 2006 
  
0 
     Segment firms in 2006 and not in 2007     11 
Panel C: Number of segment firms that dropped or switched 
     Segment firms in 2003, not in 2004, and segment firms in 2005 104 
     Segment firms in 2003, not in 2004–2005, and segment firms in 2006 2 
     Segment firms in 2005, not in 2006, and segment firms in 2007 67 
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Table 3.2 Market Valuation of Being Included in the Segments: Event Study 
 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over event windows (−1, +1) and 
(0, +1) for three announcements: (1) the creation of segments, which occurred on 
December 18, 2001, with the release of the list of firms that joined the segments; (2) the 
inclusion of firms in the segments during 2002; (3) and the removal of firms from the 
segments by Euronext during the period segments existed. I calculate CARs based on a 
market model and use Euronext100 index returns as market returns. The estimation 
window is (−256, −46) days before each announcement date. Panel A presents CARs 
around the date of Euronext’s creation of two segments, separately for firms that were 
included in the segments and for those that were not. Panel B reports CARs around the 
announcement dates of firms that were included in the segments throughout 2002. Panel 
C reports CARs around the announcement dates of firm removals from the segments over 




 indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
                
Panel A: Abnormal returns around announcement of two segments 
  Segment firms   Nonsegment firms 
CARs (−1, +1) −0.75 
 




N = 878 
CARs (0, +1) 0.44
**
       −0.18***     
Panel B: Abnormal returns around segment adoption throughout 2002 
CARs (−1, +1) 1.51*** 
 
N  = 204 
    
CARs (0, +1) 1.21
***
             
Panel C: Abnormal returns around announcement of removal 
CARs (−1, +1) −1.16*** 
 
N  = 37 
    





                                
  
Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for Nonsegment and Segment Firms in 2001 
 
This table displays summary statistics for nonsegment and segment firms in 2001. 
Segment firms are those that opted in and stayed in the segments in 2002 and 2003. See 
Section 3.8 for variable definitions. All variables are obtained from Datastream and 






indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels for differences in mean and median for each variable, 
respectively. Tests of mean differences are conducted by t test, and tests of median 
differences are based on nonparametric rank test. 
                    
 
  Nonsegment   
 
  Segment   
Variable Mean Median Std N   Mean Median Std N 






 0.04 173 






 0.15 173 






 2.30 173 






 0.25 173 




 1.66 168 






 0.07 168 






 1.85 173 




 0.65 0.38 173 






 2.79 173 
Roe 5.65 10.61 32.85 575 
 
6.95 10.84 35.97 173 






 1.00 173 




 0.08 163 
Capex 0.08 0.05 0.22 556 
 
0.08 0.05 0.13 169 




 0.12 169 
Accratio 1.73 0.57 7.80 450 
 
1.29 0.55 2.64 159 
Acc. Standard 0.01 0.00 0.11 551 
 
0.02 0.00 0.13 164 




 1.00 0.43 169 




 0.00 0.50 173 




 20.08 138 
 
  
                                
  
Table 3.4 The Effect of Being in the Segments on Firm Liquidity 
 
This table reports the effect of being in the segments on firm liquidity by estimating Eq. (3.1). Panel A and Panel B report 
results for the 2001–2002 and the 2001–2003 samples, respectively. See Section 3.8 for variable definitions. C and I denote 
country and industry fixed effects (FE), respectively. Following Petersen (2009), robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level 






 indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-difference test for 2001–2002 sample               





















































































































































−0.011*** −0.010*** −0.008*** 
  
−0.057*** −0.049*** 















     
−0.022 




     
(0.017) 
Cross-listing 




     
−0.103*** 




















































                                
  
Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel B: Difference-in-difference test for 2001–2003 sample               























































































































































−0.010*** −0.009*** −0.006*** 
  
−0.056*** −0.049*** 















     
−0.028* 




     
(0.017) 
Cross-listing 




     
−0.107*** 
























































                                
  
Table 3.5 Propensity Score Matching and Matched Sample Analysis 
 
This table displays the matched sample analysis around the segment introduction. Panel 
A presents the probit analysis using Eq. (3.2). Panel B shows the pairwise comparison of 
firm characteristics for nonsegment and segment firms after propensity score matching is 
performed. Panel C reports the difference-in-difference test result using the matched 
firms for the 2001–2002 and 2001–2003 samples. See Section 3.8 for variable 
definitions. C and I denote country and industry fixed effects, respectively. All variables 
are obtained from Datastream and Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. In Panel B, tests 
of mean differences are based on t test. In Panel C, following Petersen (2009), robust 






indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Panel A: Probit analysis 




























Sales Growth 0.151 
 
(0.134) 






















                                
  
Table 3.5 Continued 
            
Panel B: Summary statistics for matched sample     
         Nonsegment           Segment   
Variable Mean N Mean N t-diff 
Ln(Volume) 7.53 161 7.79 161 −0.86 
Volatility 0.56 161 0.57 161 −0.24 
%ΔLiquidity1 0.23 161 0.25 161 −0.17 
%ΔLiquidity2 0.01 161 0.01 161 −0.10 
Size 12.37 161 12.08 161   1.20 
Leverage 0.69 161 0.69 161 −0.19 
Mtb 2.95 161 3.06 161 −0.33 
Roe 5.49 161 7.65 161 −0.53 
Sales Growth 0.48 161 0.59 161 −1.05 
StdE 0.06 156 0.06 153 −0.34 
Capex 0.08 145 0.08 158   0.02 
Accmag 0.11 161 0.10 157   0.60 
Accratio 1.58 128 1.23 150   0.92 
Accounting Standard 0.03 154 0.02 156   0.73 
Auditor 0.74 161 0.77 161 −0.65 
Cross-listing 0.45 161 0.35 161 −0.67 
Insider-holding 50.73 128 52.17 132 −0.54 
 
Panel C: Difference-in-difference test for matched sample   
 
              2001–2002 
 
                2001–2003 
 Mean Spread Zero  Mean Spread Zero 
Constant   0.112
***




   0.103
***







Treat −0.013** −0.060*** 
 






































Size        −0.010 −0.042*** 
 



















FE C, I C, I 
 
C, I C, I 









                                
  
Table 3.6 Firm Valuation for Segment Firms from 2002 to 2007 
This table reports the valuation effects of being in the segments from 2002 to 2007. The 
left-hand side of this table presents the panel regression result for Eq. (3.4), including 
country (C), industry (I), and year (Y) fixed effects (FE). The cost of capital is estimated 
using the price-earnings-growth (PEG) model following Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and 
Easton and Monahan (2005). The right-hand side of this table presents the panel 
regression result for Eq. (3.5), including country (C), industry (I), and year (Y) fixed 
effects (FE). See Section 3.8 for variable definitions. All variables are obtained from 
Datastream and Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Following Petersen (2009), robust 







indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
          
                   Cost of capital                Tobin’s Q 

















































Sales Growth −0.023*** 
 

























FE C, I, Y 
 















                                
  
Table 3.7 Summary Statistics for Nonsegment and Segment Firms in 2007 
 
This table displays summary statistics for nonsegment and segment firms in 2007. Firms 
in the sample stayed in Euronext from 2007 to 2009 and did not change segment status 
from 2006. See Section 3.8 for variable definitions. Firm characteristics are from 







 indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
for differences in mean and median for each variable, respectively. Tests of mean 
differences are conducted by t test, and tests of median differences are based on 
nonparametric rank test. 
                    
 
        Nonsegment   
 
            Segment   
Variable Mean Median Std N   Mean Median Std N 






 0.01 133 






 0.09 133 






 1.96 133 






 1.61 133 






 0.09 133 
%ΔLiquidity1 0.00 −0.03 0.45 547 
 
−0.04 −0.01 0.23 133 
%ΔLiquidity2 −0.01 −0.02 0.08 547 
 
−0.02 −0.01*** 0.16 133 
Size 12.80  12.24 2.53 547 
 
12.58 12.57 1.51 133 




 0.61 0.24 133 




 3.02 133 






 20.87 133 




 0.42 133 
StdE 0.06  0.03 0.08 469 
 
0.06 0.03 0.09 133 
Capex 0.05  0.03 0.06 543 
 
0.05 0.03 0.06 133 
Accmag 0.15  0.05 1.71 534 
 
0.06 0.04 0.07 133 
Accratio 1.48  0.74 4.10 528 
 
1.51 0.80 4.34 133 






 0.09 133 
Auditor 0.66  1.00 0.47 498 
 
0.72 1.00 0.45 133 






 0.49 133 


















Table 3.8 Market Reaction at the Announcement of Segment Discontinuation 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the announcement of segment 
discontinuation on October 23, 2007. I use a market model, with Euronext100 index 
returns as market returns. The estimation window is (−256, −46) days before the 
announcement date. I construct daily returns using Datastream and include only firms 
with sufficient returns data within the estimation window and the event window (−1, +1). 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
      
  CARs (−1, +1) N 
Segment firms −0.70%*** 133 




                                
  
Table 3.9 The Effect of Segment Discontinuation on Firm Liquidity 
 
This table reports the effects of segment discontinuation on firm liquidity using the difference-in-difference regression for 
segment and nonsegment firms between 2007 and 2008 and between 2007 and 2009. See Section 3.8 for variable definitions. C 
and I denote country and industry fixed effects (FE), respectively. Country and industry information is obtained from Euronext 







 indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                        
 
       2007–2008 sample   
 
        2007–2009 sample 
























  (0.047) 
 















































Treat · Post 0.029
***



























































































































FE C, I 
 
    C, I 
 
 C, I 
 
   C, I 
 
  C, I          C, I 
N 1360 
 




  1352 
 
  1352 
 
  1352 
R
2






                                
  
Table 3.10 Analysis of Matched Firms Around Segment Discontinuation 
  
This table presents the analysis of matched firms around the segment discontinuation in 2007. Panel A presents summary 
statistics for the matched sample accompanied by the tests of mean differences. t-diff denotes the significance of tests of mean 
differences. Panel B reports the difference-in-difference test result for matched firms for the 2007–2008 and the 2007–2009 
samples. See Section 3.8 for variable definitions. In panel B, C and I denote country and industry fixed effects (FE), 







 indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
            
Panel A: Summary statistics for matched sample     
         Nonsegment           Segment   
Variable Mean N Mean N t-diff 
Ln(Volume) 11.52 133 11.59 133 −0.24 
Trade 0.32 133 0.30 133   1.15 
Volatility 15.23 133 15.44 133 −0.73 
%ΔLiquidity1 −0.04 133 −0.04 133 −0.28 
%ΔLiquidity2 −0.02 133 −0.02 133 −0.24 
Size 12.57 133 12.57 133 −0.01 
Leverage 0.62 133 0.60 133   0.42 
Mtb 2.80 133 2.56 133   0.62 
Roe 14.71 133 11.11 133   1.40 
Sales Growth 0.19 133 0.22 133 −0.54 
StdE 0.07 104 0.06 133   0.41 
Capex 0.04 129 0.05 133 −1.19 
Accmag 0.08 131 0..06 133   1.22 
Accratio 2.37 129 1.51 132   1.12 
Accounting Standard 0.97 133 0.99 133 −1.01 
Auditor 0.73 115 0.72 133   0.76 
Cross-listing 0.06 133 0.60 133 −0.25 







                                
  
Table 3.10 Continued 
                  
 
    
Panel B: Difference-in-differnece test for matched sample           
 
       2007–2008 sample   
 
        2007–2009 sample   
  Mean Spread Median Spread   Zero   Mean Spread Median Spread   Zero 
Constant     0.017 
 











    (0.052) 
 




   (0.066) 
 
   (0.056) 
 
(0.085) 
Treat    0.002 
 






    0.002 
 






  (0.003) 
 




   (0.003) 
 





   −0.019*** −0.014 
 
  −0.013** 
 










   (0.006) 
 
   (0.003) 
 
(0.010) 
























   (0.006) 
 
   (0.006) 
 
(0.016) 
Volatility   0.156
***


























   (0.034) 
 
   (0.018) 
 
(0.041) 
Size −0.005***    −0.004*** −0.027***   −0.001 
 










   (0.002) 
 
   (0.001) 
 
(0.004) 
Reporting   0.020 
 




  −0.048 
 










   (0.058) 
 
    (0.051) 
 
(0.064) 








   (0.005) 
 
    (0.004) 
 
(0.016) 
FE    C, I 
 
      C, I 
 
   C, I 
 
     C, I 
 
      C, I 
 
   C, I 
N     532 
 
      532 
 
   532 
 
     528 
 
      528 
 
   528 
R
2
   0.49         0.50      0.42       0.50        0.48      0.49 
 
1
1
6
 
